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P U T T I N G  T H E  F E T U S  F I R S T  – L E G A L  
R E G U L A T I O N ,  M O T H E R H O O D , A N D  
P R E G N A N C Y
Emma Milne∗
Abstract
The fetus-first mentality advocates that pregnant women and women 
who could become pregnant should put the needs and well-being of their fe-
tuses before their own. As this Article will illustrate, this popular public per-
ception has pervaded criminal law, impacting responses to women deemed to 
be the “irresponsible” pregnant woman and so the “bad” mother. The Article 
considers cases from Alabama and Indiana in the United States and from 
England in the United Kingdom, providing clear evidence that concerns 
about the behavior of pregnant women now hang heavily over criminal jus-
tice responses to women who experience a negative pregnancy outcome or 
who are perceived to have behaved in a way that could result in a negative 
outcome. This Article provides a new approach by bringing together a criti-
cal assessment of fetal protection laws with theories of motherhood ideologies 
and analyzing how such ideologies have resulted in legal developments not 
only in the US, where the fetus has been granted legal recognition in most 
states, but also in England and Wales, where the fetus continues to have no 
legal personality. The Article will conclude that the application of the fetus-
first mentality within criminal law has resulted in dangerous legal develop-
ments that challenge women’s rights, while doing little to protect fetuses.
∗ Lecturer in Criminology, University of Plymouth. My thanks go to the John W. 
Kluge Center at the Library of Congress, the Arts and Humanities Research Council, 
and the Consortium for the Humanities and the Arts South-East England, who 
funded and supported this research. I would also like to thank Dr. Karen Brennan, 
Professor Jackie Turton, and Professor Pete Fussey for feedback and comments on 
previous drafts of this Article.
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I. Introduction
Concern over the rights and well-being of the fetus1 has arguably 
become a normal aspect of the modern world. For example, the 
mortality rates of both pregnant women and their fetuses/newborn 
infants continues to be a focus of national and international health 
agencies,2 there are numerous advice guides for the period of 
pregnancy,3 and there are continuous revisions to public health messages 
for pregnant women.4 This focus on health has resulted in scrutiny of 
the behavior of pregnant women, and, more recently, women who may 
become pregnant,5 in relation to the impact their behavior may have 
upon the health of their fetus. Women’s consumption of certain foods,6
alcohol,7 cigarettes,8 and illegal substances,9 and their rates of obesity,10
1. Fetus is not the technically correct term for all periods of gestational development. 
Different terms are associated with different periods of development: zygote (at ferti-
lization), blastocyst (at implantation, six to ten days after ovulation), embryo (at 
about two weeks), and fetus (from eight weeks until birth). Stephanie Dionne Sherk, 
Prenatal Development, in GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHILDREN’S HEALTH 1507, 1507–
09 (1st ed. 2006). I will use the term ‘fetus’ for ease, and, unless specifically stated 
otherwise, I am referring to a human developing in the womb from the point of con-
ception until a separate existence from the pregnant woman has occurred.
2. See, e.g., Health Matters: Reproductive Health and Pregnancy Planning, PUB. HEALTH 
ENG., https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/health-matters-reproductive-
health-and-pregnancy-planning/health-matters-reproductive-health-and-pregnancy-
planning (last visited May 27, 2019); Maternal Health, UNITED NATIONS 
POPULATION FUND, https://www.unfpa.org/maternal-health (last visited May 27, 
2019); Maternal, Newborn, Child and Adolescent Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/maternal_child_adolescent/maternal/en/ (last visited May 27, 
2019).
3. See, e.g., Pregnancy, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/pregnancy/index.html (last visited May 27, 2019); Your Preg-
nancy and Baby Guide, NAT’L HEALTH SERV., https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/
pregnancy-and-baby/ (last visited May 27, 2019); Pregnancy, OFF. ON WOMEN’S
HEALTH, https://www.womenshealth.gov/pregnancy (last visited May 27, 2019).
4. For example, advice relating to alcohol consumption during pregnancy has changed 
substantially in the UK over the last twenty years, and the advice has not always con-
formed with the latest evidence about the impact of alcohol on the health of the fe-
tus. See Betsy Thom et al., Drinking in Pregnancy: Shifting Towards the “Precautionary 
Principle,” in ALCOHOL, DRUGS AND RISK: FRAMING DANGEROUS CLASSES AND 
DANGEROUS SPACES: HISTORICAL AND CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 66 (Susanne 
MacGregor & Betsy Thom eds., 2020).
5. See, e.g., Planning for Pregnancy, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/preconception/planning.html (last visited May 27, 2019);
Planning Your Pregnancy, NAT’L HEALTH SERV., https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/
pregnancy-and-baby/planning-pregnancy/ (last visited May 27. 2019); Preconception
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levels of stress,11 certain pre-existing medical conditions,12 how they 
wear a seat belt,13 and the level of pollution in the air they breathe14 are 
Health, OFF. ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, https://www.womenshealth.gov/pregnancy/
you-get-pregnant/preconception-health (last visited May 27, 2019).
6. See, e.g., Checklist of Foods to Avoid During Pregnancy, FOODSAFETY.GOV,
https://www.foodsafety.gov/risk/pregnant/chklist_pregnancy.html (last visited May 
27. 2019); Food Safety for Pregnant Women, FOODSAFETY.GOV,
https://www.foodsafety.gov/risk/pregnant/index.html (last visited May 27, 2019); 
Foods to Avoid in Pregnancy, NAT’L HEALTH SERV., https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/
pregnancy-and-baby/foods-to-avoid-pregnant/ (last visited May 27, 2019); Have a 
Healthy Diet in Pregnancy, NAT’L HEALTH SERV., https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/
pregnancy-and-baby/healthy-pregnancy-diet/ (last visited May 27, 2019).
7. See, e.g., Alcohol Use in Pregnancy, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/fasd/alcohol-use.html (last visited May 27, 2019); 
Drinking Alcohol While Pregnant, NAT’L HEALTH SERV., https://www.nhs.uk/
conditions/pregnancy-and-baby/alcohol-medicines-drugs-pregnant/ (last visited May 
27, 2019).
8. See, e.g, Smoking During Pregnancy, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/basic_information/health_effects/pregnancy/index.htm
(last visited May 27, 2019); Stop Smoking in Pregnancy, NAT’L HEALTH SERV.,
https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/pregnancy-and-baby/smoking-pregnant/ (last visited 
May 27, 2019).
9. See, e.g., Substance Use During Pregnancy, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/
substance-abuse/substance-abuse-during-pregnancy.htm (last visited May 27, 2019); 
Illegal Drugs in Pregnancy, NAT’L HEALTH SERV., https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/
pregnancy-and-baby/illegal-drugs-in-pregnancy/ (last visited May 27, 2019).
10. See, e.g, Overweight and Pregnant, NAT’L HEALTH SERV., https://www.nhs.uk/
conditions/pregnancy-and-baby/overweight-pregnant/ (last visited 27 May 2019); 
Weight, Fertility, and Pregnancy, OFF. ON WOMEN’S HEALTH,
https://www.womenshealth.gov/healthy-weight/weight-fertility-and-pregnancy (last 
visited May 27, 2019).
11. See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Burns et al., Stressful Life Events Experienced by Women in the 
Year Before Their Infants’ Births – United States, 2000–2010, 64 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 247 (2015); Healthy Beginnings: Applying All Our Health,
PUB. HEALTH ENG., https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/healthy-
beginnings-applying-all-our-health/healthy-beginnings-applying-all-our-health (last 
visited May 27, 2019).
12. See, e.g., Pregnancy Complications, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/pregnancy-
complications.html (last visited May 27, 2019); Pregnant Women and Zika, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/pregnancy/zika/
protect-yourself.html (last visited May 27, 2019); Pregnancy and HIV, Viral Hepatitis, 
STD, & TB Prevention, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/pregnancy/Default.htm (last visited 27 May 2019); 
Preconception Health, OFF. ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, https://www.womenshealth.gov/
pregnancy/you-get-pregnant/preconception-health (last visited May 27, 2019); Thy-
roid Disease & Pregnancy, NAT’L INST. DIABETES & DIGESTIVE & KIDNEY DISEASES,
https://www.niddk.nih.gov/health-information/endocrine-diseases/pregnancy-
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just some examples of areas in which advice is given to women who 
either are pregnant or may become pregnant in order to ensure the 
health of their fetus. The scale and scope of guidance is such that for 
many women the advice and subsequent expectation result in the need 
to alter their lives completely for the period of pregnancy15 and 
potentially a substantial period before becoming pregnant.16 This 
expectation of modified behavior can be understood as a “fetus-first 
mentality”—the idea that it is perfectly normal and appropriate for a 
woman who is pregnant to put the needs and well-being of her fetus 
before her own needs and well-being. Such expectations have received 
criticism for creating a perspective whereby the life and well-being of a 
fetus is given preference and priority over the rights and needs of the 
pregnant woman and even a woman who is not yet pregnant.17 Such 
concerns about women’s behavior while pregnant take on a new 
thyroid-disease (last visited May 27, 2019); High Blood Pressure (Hypertension) and 
Pregnancy, NAT’L HEALTH SERV., https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/pregnancy-and-
baby/hypertension-blood-pressure-pregnant/ (last visited May 27, 2019); Epilepsy and 
Pregnancy, NAT’L HEALTH SERV., https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/pregnancy-and-
baby/epilepsy-pregnant/ (last visited May 27, 2019); Mental Health Problems and 
Pregnancy, NAT’L HEALTH SERV., https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/pregnancy-and-
baby/mental-health-problems-pregnant/ (last visited May 27, 2019); Diabetes and 
Pregnancy, NAT’L HEALTH SERV., https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/pregnancy-and-
baby/diabetes-pregnant/ (last visited May 27, 2019).
13. Steve Ford, Many Women Maybe Unaware of Correct Seatbelt Use While Pregnant,
NURSING TIMES (May 27, 2019), https://www.nursingtimes.net/news/policies-and-
guidance/many-women-maybe-unaware-of-correct-seatbelt-use-while-pregnant/
7024459.article; Seat Belt Safety: Pregnancy, CHILDREN’S HOSP. PHILA.,
https://www.chop.edu/pages/seat-belt-safety-pregnancy (last visited May 27, 2019).
14. Damian Carrington, Air Pollution “As Bad as Smoking in Increasing Risk of Miscar-
riage,” GUARDIAN (May 27, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2019/jan/11/air-pollution-as-bad-as-smoking-in-increasing-risk-of-
miscarriage.
15. See Anne Drapkin Lyerly et al., Risk and the Pregnant Body, 39 HASTINGS CTR. REP.
34 (2009) (arguing that advice for women in terms of their everyday behavior is not 
based entirely on evidence but is based on the mantra of “better safe than sorry,” even 
in cases where evidence does not support the advice being given); see also Thom et al., 
supra note 4.
16. Zoe Williams, So Now Pregnancy Is a Prize for Women Who Lead a “Good Life,” THE 
GUARDIAN (May 5, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2016/may/30/pregnancy-women-public-health-babies.
17. See, e.g., SUSAN BORDO, UNBEARABLE WEIGHT: FEMINISM, WESTERN CULTURE, AND 
THE BODY 71–98 (2003); Wendy Chavkin, Women and the Foetus: The Social Con-
struction of Conflict, in THE CRIMINALIZATION OF A WOMAN’S BODY 193, 194 
(Clarice Feinman ed., 1992); Jeffrey P. Phelan, The Maternal Abdominal Wall: A For-
tress Against Fetal Health Care?, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 461, 481 (1991); Lealle Ruhl, Lib-
eral Governance and Prenatal Care: Risk and Regulation in Pregnancy, 28 ECON. &
SOC’Y 95, 1077–79 (1999).
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dynamic when considering the implications that these concerns have for 
criminal law.
This Article focuses on concerns about the impact of behavior by 
pregnant women upon their fetuses and the influence these concerns 
have had on criminal law. The implications of societal expectations that 
women will put the fetus first are clearly outlined and critiqued by ana-
lyzing two types of cases: Killing the fetus and consuming controlled 
substances during pregnancy.
This Article will consider cases from Alabama and Indiana in the 
United States and England in the United Kingdom. Concerns about the 
behavior of pregnant women and women who could become pregnant 
have permeated criminal law and now hang heavily over criminal justice 
responses to women who experience a negative pregnancy outcome or 
who are perceived to have behaved in a way that could result in a nega-
tive outcome. In assessing cases from the UK and US, I will illustrate 
how perceptions of “good” maternal behavior, which encompasses the 
principle of putting the fetus first, have influenced the application of 
law. Analyzing cases from different jurisdictions clearly shows the influ-
ence of the fetus-first mentality on the creation and application of crim-
inal law. 
This Article provides a new approach by bringing together a critical 
assessment of fetal protection laws with theories of motherhood ideolo-
gies and analyzing how such ideologies have resulted in legal develop-
ments not only in the US, where we have seen a clear change of laws, 
with fetuses being granted legal recognition in most states, but also in 
England and Wales, where the law has been static for almost 100 years 
and the fetus continues to have no legal personality.
In England and Wales, a person must be born alive and be a “rea-
sonable creature in rerum natura” in order to be a victim of a crime 
against a person or a homicide offense.18 A consequence of the “born 
alive rule” is that a fetus does not have legal personality. Instead, it is 
18. In rerum natura means “in existence.” EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE 
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER 
PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 50–51 (1680). To be considered a 
person “in existence,” the child must have an existence that is independent of its 
mother, meaning it must have been wholly expelled from its mother’s body and be 
alive. R. v. Enoch (1833) 172 Eng. Rep. 1089 (KB); R. v. Poulton (1832) 172 Eng. 
Rep. 997. The cord and afterbirth need not have been expelled from the mother’s
body, nor do they need to be severed from the child. R. v. Reeves (1839) 173 Eng. 
Rep. 724 (KB). The test for independent existence is that the child has an independ-
ent circulation and has breathed after birth. See R. v. Handley (1874) 172 Eng. Rep. 
1100 (KB); R. v. Wright (1841) 173 Eng. Rep. 1039 (KB); R. v. Brain (1834) 172 
Eng. Rep. 1272 (KB).
2020] P U T T I N G  T H E  F E T U S  F IR S T 155
conceptualized as a “unique organism,” that is “neither a distinct person 
separate from its mother nor merely an adjunct of the mother.”19 Con-
sequently, fetuses have few legal protections prior to the completion of 
birth that results in a live-born child.20 Therefore, a pregnant woman or 
woman in labor who has acted in a way that resulted in the death of the 
fetus has not committed a criminal offense,21 with two exceptions. The 
first exception occurs if it can be proven the woman intentionally acted 
to end her own pregnancy, in which case the offense of procuring a mis-
carriage has been committed.22 The second exception is if she intention-
ally acted to prevent a viable fetus from living, in which case the offense 
of child destruction may apply.23 Procuring a miscarriage criminalizes 
the ending of a pregnancy at any stage of gestation by any person, and 
child destruction makes it an offense to kill a child that is capable of be-
ing born alive, once the pregnancy has reached 28 gestational weeks. 
Outside of these two offenses, a woman is not legally obliged to protect 
her fetus from harm and does not owe the fetus a duty of care.24
In England and Wales there is one further pregnancy-related 
offense relevant to this Article: The offense of concealment of birth, 
which prohibits the concealment of the knowledge of a birth through 
the secret disposal of the body of a child.25 It is a homicide-related 
19. Att’y Gen.’s Reference (No.3 of 1994) [19980] AC 245 (HL) (UK).
20. Signified by complete expulsion from the birth canal, independent circulation, and 
breathing after birth. See supra note 18.
21. Att’y Gen.’s Reference, [1998] AC 245 (HL); R. v West (1848) 175 Eng. Rep. 329 
(KB).
22. Offenses Against the Person Act 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, § 58 (Eng. & Wales).
23. Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1928, 19 & 20 Geo. 5 c. 34, § 1 (UK & Wales). The 
offense was first enacted in the 1920s in response to the belief that women were at-
tempting to escape prosecution under the offenses of procuring a miscarriage or mur-
der by waiting for natural labor to commence, the baby to be partially born, and then 
killing the child before its body was completely expelled from the birth canal. In such 
instances, no criminal offense had been committed. As such, child destruction was 
enacted to close this legal loophole. Donna Cooper Graves, “ . . . In a Frenzy While 
Raving Mad”: Physicians and Parliamentarians Define Infanticide in Victorian England,
in KILLING INFANTS: STUDIES IN THE WORLDWIDE PRACTICE OF INFANTICIDE 111 
(Brigitte H. Bechtold & Donna Cooper Graves eds., 2006); D Seaborne Davies, 
Child-Killing in English Law, 1 MOD. L. REV. 203 (1937). Today, the offense is 
mostly used when third-parties (often the partner or ex-partner of the pregnant wom-
an) attack a pregnant woman, resulting in the death of the fetus. Only one instance 
of a woman being prosecuted for the offense due to her actions to kill her own fetus 
has been recorded. Sally Sheldon, The Decriminalisation of Abortion: An Argument for 
Modernisation, 36 OXF. J. LEGAL STUD. 334, 340–42 (2016).
24. CP (A Child) v First-Tier Tribunal (criminal injuries compensation) [2014] QB 459, 
479.
25. Offenses Against the Person Act 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c.100, § 60 (Eng. & Wales).
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offense but does not actually involve the homicide of the child, although 
it may be charged concurrently. The child need not be born alive, but if 
it is born alive, then it must be dead prior to the concealment of the 
body.26 While the offense is punishable by up to two years in prison, an 
immediate custodial sentence is very rare.27 Enacted in 1803, the offense 
was used to criminalize those women who were suspected of killing their 
newborn children, but who could not be proven to have done so due to 
the difficulties of proving live birth.28 Today, the offense is rarely 
prosecuted with only four convictions between 2010 and 2014, mostly 
of women who have given birth to the child.29 Recent analysis of the 
offense has concluded that it continues to be used today as it was 
historically—to punish women who are suspected of homicide but 
cannot be proven to have killed their child.30 There is also evidence to 
suggest the offense is used to punish women who transgress traditional 
gender roles, specifically ideals of motherhood.31
The position of the fetus in English and Welsh law contrasts to 
most jurisdictions in the United States, despite the United States adher-
ing to the common law principle of the born alive rule until the 1970s.32
California was the first state to recognize the fetus as a potential victim 
of homicide.33 In 1970 the state legislature amended their homicide law 
to include the fetus as a possible victim of unlawful killing.34 This 
change in the penal code arose after the Superior Court of California 
ruled that Robert Keeler could not be convicted of murder for causing 
his pregnant ex-wife, Teresa, to give birth to a stillborn child after he 
kneed her in the abdomen while shouting, “I’m going to stamp it out of 
26. R. v. May (1867) 16 LT 362 (Eng. & Wales).
27. Emma Milne, Concealment of Birth: Time to Repeal a 200-Year-Old “Convenient Stop-
Gap”?, 27 FEM. LEGAL STUD. 139, 140 (2019).
28. MARK JACKSON, NEW-BORN CHILD MURDER: WOMEN, ILLEGITIMACY AND THE 
COURTS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 168–76 (1996); Davies, supra note 
23, at 213–16 (1937); Ann R. Higginbotham, “Sin of the Age”: Infanticide and Illegit-
imacy in Victorian London, 32 VICTORIAN STUD. 319, 327 (1989).
29. Milne, supra note 27, at 140.
30. Id. at 148–51.
31. Id. at 152–58.
32. However, the fetus was recognized in law in specific circumstances, such as the ability 
to inherit if born alive after the death of its father. See Dawn Johnsen, The Creation of 
Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women’s Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and 
Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986).
33. See Katharine B. Folger, When Does Life Begin . . . or End? The California Supreme 
Court Redefines Fetal Murder in People v. Davis, 29 U.S.F.L. REV. 237, 237 (1994) 
(discussing the development of the California Penal Code to include the fetus as a 
potential victim).
34. Id. at 238 n.7.
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you.”35 The law was changed so that a fetus that has passed the embry-
onic stage (approximately six to eight gestational weeks) could be a vic-
tim of unlawful killing.36 The law now reads: “Murder is the unlawful 
killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.”37
At least 38 states now have laws protecting fetuses,38 and at least 29 
of these states apply their laws to the early stages of pregnancy, employ-
ing language such as “any state of gestation,” “conception,” “fertiliza-
tion,” or “post-fertilization.”39 Fetuses have been included in penal codes 
in a number of different ways across the states. In some states, such as 
California, the fetus or “unborn child” has been added as a potential vic-
tim of homicide.40 In other states the fetus has been defined as a “per-
son” or “human being” so that it is protected by existing laws.41 Other 
states have made it a specific offense to injure or kill a fetus, or to com-
mit “feticide.”42 Massachusetts is unique in that it is the only state to 
recognize the fetus as a victim of homicide through case law alone.43
Changes to federal law have also been made on this basis, with the Un-
born Victims of Violence Act recognizing the fetus as a separate victim 
from the pregnant woman if it is killed or experiences bodily injury dur-
ing the commission of a federal crime of violence.44
Despite the expansion of criminal law to protect the fetus, in 24 
states and in federal law, statutes include “maternal exceptions,” where-
35. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 623 (Cal. 1970).
36. Andrew S. Murphy, A Survey of State Fetal Homicide Laws and Their Potential Ap-
plicability to Pregnant Women Who Harm Their Own Fetuses, 89 IND. L.J. 847, 878 
(2014).
37. CAL. PENAL CODE § 8-187(a) (West 2019).
38. Within the literature, scholars often refer to “fetal homicide laws.” However, as ar-
gued here, protection of fetuses stretches beyond homicide offenses, and so I argue 
that “fetal protection laws” is a more appropriate term to capture the developments of 
law in US states from 1970 onward.
39. State Laws on Fetal Homicide and Penalty-Enhancement for Crimes Against Pregnant 
Women, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (May 1, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/health/fetal-homicide-state-laws.aspx.
40. Murphy, supra note 36, at 865.
41. For example, in Kansas, homicide and battery offenses apply to “persons,” which in-
clude the “unborn child,” defined as “a living individual organism of the species homo 
sapiens, in utero, at any stage of gestation from fertilization to birth.” KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 21-5401, 21-5406, 21-5413, 21-5419, (2019).
42. For example, Louisiana specifies that the offense of feticide is the “killing of an un-
born child by the act, procurement, or culpable omission of a person other than the 
mother of the unborn child.” LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.5 (2019).
43. State Laws on Fetal Homicide and Penalty-Enhancement For Crimes Against Pregnant 
Women, supra note 39; see also Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 
1984).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2019); 10 U.S.C. § 919a (2019).
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by the law specifically excludes pregnant women from prosecution in 
relation to their own pregnancy.45 For example, the Unborn Victim of 
Violence Act 2004 states, “Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
permit the prosecution . . . of any woman with respect to her unborn 
child.”46 Similarly, in four states it would appear unlikely that a preg-
nant woman would be prosecuted for causing the death of her fetus due 
to the wording of the legislation.47 However, other states are silent on 
whether or not a pregnant woman could be held liable. This leaves the 
possibility of criminal proceedings against women to individual prosecu-
tors, who, evidence would suggest, have demonstrated willingness to ad-
vocate for a broad interpretation of such statutes.48
As a consequence of laws protecting fetuses, over 413 women were 
arrested, detained, and forced to have medical treatment between 1973 
and 2005.49 These arrests and detainments have resulted in forced Cae-
sarean sections,50 and the arrest and sometime imprisonment of women 
following the stillbirth or miscarriage of a baby,51 or after they have not 
followed medical advice in relation to their pregnancy.52 Similarly, 
women have faced criminal justice involvement in cases where the baby 
has been born alive and then died shortly after birth, and medical pro-
45. Murphy, supra note 36, at 865.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(3). See Murphy, supra note 36, for further discussion of mater-
nal exceptions in both federal and state laws.
47. Murphy, supra note 36, at 865–66.
48. Id. at 866.
49. Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant 
Women in the United States, 1973–2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and 
Public Health, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 299, 299–300 (2013) [hereinafter Pal-
trow & Flavin, Forced Interventions]. An additional 300 cases were documented be-
tween 2005 and 2013. Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Are Pregnant Women Per-
sons After 20 Weeks’ Gestation?, REWIRE NEWS (Nov. 15 2013), 
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/11/15/are-pregnant-women-persons-after-20-
weeks-gestation/.
50. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (Angela Carder was forced to undergo a life-
threatening Caesarean section against her wishes, and the wishes of her family and 
doctor, in an unsuccessful attempt to save the life of her fetus).
51. Kevin Hayes, Did Christine Taylor Take Abortion into Her Own Hands?, CBS NEWS
(Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/did-christine-taylor-take-abortion-
into-her-own-hands/; Amie Newman, Pregnant? Don’t Fall Down the Stairs, REWIRE
NEWS (Feb. 15, 2010), https://rewire.news/article/2010/02/15/pregnant-dont-fall-
down-stairs/.
52. Mother Charged in Caesarean Row, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
americas/3504720.stm (last updated Mar. 12, 2004); Linda Thomson, Mother is 
Charged in Stillbirth of a Twin, DESERET NEWS (Mar. 12, 2004), 
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/595048573/Mother-is-charged-in-stillbirth-of-a-
twin.html?pg=all.
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fessionals and law enforcers have deemed that the actions of the birth-
mother while pregnant were the cause of the death of the child.53 Wom-
en have also been imprisoned following a live-born child testing positive 
for an illegal substance54 and homicide convictions have been sought in 
instances where a pregnancy loss has been believed to be an illegal abor-
tion.55
As analysis in this Article will illustrate, the differing legal status of 
fetuses across jurisdictions appears to have limited impact on the appli-
cation of law to criminalize women for behavior deemed to harm or 
have potential to harm the fetus. Instead, the perception that a woman 
should put her fetus’s needs and well-being before her own needs and 
desires—the fetus-first mentality—appears to be driving decisions to 
prosecute and apply criminal law. In Part II of this Article, I will outline 
the theory of the fetus-first mentality, analyzing what it is, and how it 
materializes. Part III will assess four cases in the context of the fetus-first 
mentality: Two relating to an illegal termination of a pregnancy, Purvi 
Patel in Indiana, US, and Hayley in England, UK, and two relating to 
consuming controlled substances in pregnancy, Amanda Kimbrough in 
Alabama, US, and Sally in England, UK.56 In Part VI, I will discuss the 
implications on fetuses and women of the fetus-first mentality influenc-
ing the criminal law.
II.  Fetus-first Mentality
The fetus-first mentality is pervasive in both the US and UK. The 
principle that the health and welfare of the fetus should be put before 
the mother’s has a tangible impact on the behavior of pregnant wom-
53. People v. Jorgensen, 41 N.E.3d 778, 779 (N.Y. 2015).
54. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2.d 777 (S.C. 1997); Laura Bassett, Judge Tosses Murder
Case Against Mississippi Mom With Stillborn Baby, HUFFPOST (Apr. 3 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/03/judge-tosses-mississippi-_n_
5086215.html.
55. Liz Hunt, Abortion Most Desperate, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 21 1995), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/abortion-most-desperate-1612131.html; Ed 
Pilkington, Indiana Prosecuting Chinese Woman for Suicide Attempt that Killed Her 
Foetus, THE GUARDIAN (May 30, 2012, 1:36 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2012/may/30/indiana-prosecuting-chinese-woman-suicide-foetus.
56. “Hayley” and “Sally” are not the defendants’ real names. While both cases were heard 
in open court, where their names were published, I have anonymized the cases in line 
with requirements imposed by the courts to view the cases. The anonymization is of 
the identities of the defendants and all other parties involved in the cases and includes 
withholding details such as class, exact age, ethnicity, geographical location, and the 
court in which the case was heard.
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en,57 with many women making decisions to modify their actions in 
order to safeguard the health of their unborn child.58 However, preg-
nant woman are not the only people who act in ways that prioritize the 
well-being of the fetus. As well as influencing social expectations of 
women’s behavior while pregnant, the fetus-first mentality also has an 
effect on numerous institutions. In this Part I provide an introduction 
to the fetus-first mentality and then illustrate how it is linked to moth-
erhood ideologies.
A. Introducing the Fetus-first Mentality
Public health messages that relate to pregnancy are saturated with 
the fetus-first mentality in both the US and the UK. For example, in 
2016, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) released 
guidance about drinking alcohol while pregnant that included the fol-
lowing message, “Sexually active women who stop using birth control 
should stop drinking alcohol, but most keep drinking . . . Alcohol can 
permanently harm a developing baby before a woman knows she is 
pregnant . . . The risk is real. Why take the chance?”59 The guidance, 
advocating abstinence from alcohol due to the damage it may cause to 
the fetus, targeted not only pregnant women and those planning to con-
ceive, but also women who are not pregnant, and even those who had 
no plans to become pregnant. Similarly, in the UK, the National Health 
Service of Greater Glasgow and Clyde, Scotland, published a report to 
support medical professionals working with women of childbearing age, 
advocating that at any time said group of women come into contact 
with medical professionals, the professional should ask if there is a rea-
sonable chance the woman will start a pregnancy that year.60 The guid-
57. Deborah Lupton, “The Best Thing for the Baby”: Mothers’ Concepts and Experiences 
Related to Promoting their Infants’ Health and Development, 13 HEALTH RISK & SOC.
637 (2011); Lyerly et al., supra note 15; Ruhl, supra note 17.
58. For example, avoiding certain food and drink or exposure to medication, substances 
and situations that may cause harm. S. R. Crozier et al., Do Women Change Their 
Health Behaviours in Pregnancy? Findings from the Southampton Women’s Survey, 23 
PAEDIATRIC & PERINATAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 446, 446 (2009).
59. More Than 3 Million US Women at Risk for Alcohol-Exposed Pregnancy, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/media/
releases/2016/p0202-alcohol-exposed-pregnancy.html.
60. JONATHAN SHER, MISSED PERIOD: SCOTLAND’S OPPORTUNITIES FOR BETTER 
PREGNANCIES, HEALTHIER PARENTS AND THRIVING BABIES THE FIRST TIME . . . AND 
EVERY TIME 32 (2017), http://www.nhsggc.org.uk/media/237840/missed-periods-j-
sher-may-2016.pdf.
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ance advised that in instances where women answered “yes,” health pro-
fessionals should encourage women to abstain from harmful substances, 
such as alcohol, smoking, and drugs; lose weight; leave violent and abu-
sive partners; and avoid exposure to radiation and illnesses such as HIV, 
diabetes, rubella, and the Zika virus.61
The nature of the initial inquiry into pregnancy status needs to be 
examined, with particular attention to the term “reasonable chance.” As 
the report acknowledges, approximately fifty percent of pregnancies in 
the UK are unplanned; consequently, one reading of this guidance is 
that all women of childbearing age (excluding women who have evi-
dence they are infertile) would need to heed the advice, as a woman’s 
engagement in sexual activity means there is a reasonable chance she will 
start a pregnancy.62 Even women who choose to not engage in sexual ac-
tivity still have a “reasonable chance” of becoming pregnant, with one in 
five women in England and Wales experiencing some type of sexual as-
sault at least once in her lifetime,63 and one in six American women be-
ing the victim of an attempted or completed rape in her lifetime.64
However, it should be noted, that these statistics are likely to underes-
timate the true numbers of victims and survivors of sexual violence.65
If read in a more critical light, the guidance can be interpreted as 
arguing that pregnancy is a compelling reason for women to become 
“healthy” by conforming to the health suggestion, while the state ap-
61. Id.
62. On the basis that even long acting reversible contraceptive methods cannot be said to 
be one-hundred percent effective, with a one percent chance of possibility of preg-
nancy. How Effective is Contraception at Preventing Pregnancy?, NAT’L HEALTH SERV.
(June 30, 2017), https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/contraception/how-effective-
contraception/.
63. Sexual Offenses in England and Wales: Year Ending March 2017, OFF. FOR NAT’L
STAT. (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/
crimeandjustice/articles/sexualoffencesinenglandandwales/yearendingmarch2017. It is 
estimated that one in six American women has been the victim of an attempted or 
completed rape in her lifetime (14.8 percent completed, 2.8 percent attempted). 
Scope of the Problem: Statistics, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/scope-
problem (last visited May 10, 2019). However, it should be noted, that these statis-
tics are likely to underestimate the true numbers of victims and survivors of sexual vi-
olence. Katrin Hohl & Elisabeth A. Stanko, Complaints of Rape and the Criminal Jus-
tice System: Fresh Evidence on the Attrition Problem in England and Wales, 12 EUR. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 324 (2015); Kate B. Wolitzky-Taylor, et al., Reporting Rape in a Na-
tional Sample of College Women, 59 J. AM. COLL. HEALTH 582 (2011).
64. 14.8 percent completed, 2.8 percent attempted. Scope of the Problem: Statistics,
RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/scope-problem (last visited May 10, 2019).
65. Hohl & Stanko, supra note 63; Kate B. Wolitzky-Taylor et al., Reporting Rape in a 
National Sample of College Women, 59 J. AM. C. HEALTH 582 (2011).
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pears to have fewer concerns about women’s exposure to harms such as 
abusive partners or radiation outside of pregnancy. The author of the 
report makes positive reference to the increased use of long acting re-
versible contraception (LARC) by people in Scotland due to the meth-
ods being long-lasting and therefore not dependent upon the user re-
membering to use them.66 One of the key messages from the report is 
that health professionals should be “[k]eeping preconception ‘in sight 
and in mind’ [as it] is the essential catalyst for effective action.”67 As 
such, an inherent suggestion within the report is that men and women 
of reproductive age are always in the preconception phase and that 
LARC methods are preferable to reduce the chances of unplanned preg-
nancy—and if the pregnancy is planned then the advice is to become 
pregnancy-ready by following the guidance outlined above.68 As LARCs 
are only developed for women, the underlying suggestion is that wom-
en’s reproduction needs to be controlled through LARCs to manage 
their risk of pregnancy and harm that will be done to the fetus due to 
the woman’s lifestyle “choices.”
The accepted view that women need to do all they can to be 
healthy while pregnant can be traced, in part, to the expectation that a 
pregnancy will end with the birth of a healthy, live-born child who will 
be mothered by the pregnant woman.69 And yet, a positive outcome of a 
pregnancy is neither guaranteed nor predictable. Pregnancy is a highly 
medicalized and managed state, regulated and monitored by medical 
professionals and pregnant women.70 The development of this medical 
66. SHER, supra note 60, at 8.
67. Id. at 10.
68. Id.
69. Such an expectation has been credited with the “shame” connected to abortion and 
miscarriage. See generally, Aalap Bommaraju et al., Situating Stigma in Stratified Re-
production, 10 SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTHCARE 62 (2016) (arguing that stigma sur-
rounding abortion and miscarriage act as barriers to reproductive healthcare); Lesley 
Hoggart, Internalised Abortion Stigma: Young Women’s Strategies of Resistance and Re-
jection, 27 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 186 (2017) (exploring young women’s strategies of 
resistance to the stigma surrounding abortion); Anuradha Kumar et al., Conceptualis-
ing Abortion Stigma, 11 CULTURE HEALTH & SEXUALITY 625 (2009) (theorizing 
abortion stigma, identifying social and political processes that favor the emergence, 
perpetuation and normalization of abortion stigma).
70. For more information about the medicalization of pregnancy in the US and the UK, 
see generally BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, WITCHES, MIDWIVES, &
NURSES: A HISTORY OF WOMEN HEALERS (2d ed. 2010); JUDITH WALZER LEAVITT,
BROUGHT TO BED (1st ed. 1986); ANN OAKLEY, THE CAPTURED WOMB (1984); 
ANN OAKLEY, ESSAYS ON WOMEN, MEDICINE AND HEALTH (1993); RICHARD W.
WERTZ & DOROTHY C. WERTZ, LYING-IN: A HISTORY OF CHILDBIRTH IN AMERICA
(1977).
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intervention and monitoring of pregnancy is, in part, in response to the 
uncertainty surrounding the outcomes of pregnancy.71 During the past 
150 years, medical knowledge of pregnancy and childbirth has accumu-
lated, resulting in the construction of pregnancy in medical knowledge 
as a period where two patients are contained within one body.72 Desire 
to protect maternal and fetal life has resulted in checklists of behaviors 
that may positively or negatively impact the health and well-being of the 
fetus.
Changing expectations of behavior during pregnancy have had 
consequences on the lives of pregnant women, who, feminists argue, are 
expected to self-manage their own risk of poor outcomes and the risk to 
their fetus.73 The development of medical knowledge that constructs the 
fetus as a subject distinct from its mother, and responses to that 
knowledge, have led many feminists to critique modern obstetric care, 
arguing that the fetus has become the focus, the patient, while the preg-
nant woman is perceived as a fetal carrier, incubator, or container.74 Fur-
ther development of fetal imaging techniques75 and fetal surgery to di-
rectly treat the fetus76 have reinforced this critique. Feminists have 
argued that such technology and developments frame the fetus as an in-
dependent entity, consequently marginalizing the woman.77 Further-
more, changing medical perspectives of pregnancy have led to the preg-
nant woman being constructed as a potential threat to the fetus, and the 
71. OAKLEY, THE CAPTURED WOMB, supra note 70, at 220–21.
72. WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 70, at 241–43; see also ROBBIE DAVIS-FLOYD, BIRTH 
AS AN AMERICAN RITE OF PASSAGE (1st ed. 1992); CLARE HANSON, A CULTURAL 
HISTORY OF PREGNANCY (2004); LEAVITT, supra note 70; Ann Oakley, The Sociology 
of Childbirth: An Autobiographical Journey Through Four Decades of Research, 38 SOC.
HEALTH & ILLNESS 689 (2016).
73. Ruhl, supra note 17, at 96.
74. BORDO, supra note 17, at 71–98; EMILY MARTIN, THE WOMAN IN THE BODY: A
CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF REPRODUCTION 54 (1987); ROBYN LONGHURST, BODIES:
EXPLORING FLUID BOUNDARIES 55 (2001); DEBORAH LUPTON, Risk and the Ontology 
of Pregnant Embodiment, in RISK AND SOCIOCULTURAL THEORY: NEW DIRECTIONS 
AND PERSPECTIVES 59-85 (Deborah Lupton ed. 1999); Wendy Chavkin, Women and 
Fetus, 3 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 71 (1992). See generally, IRIS MARION YOUNG,
THROWING LIKE A GIRL AND OTHER ESSAYS IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 160–72
(1990).
75. Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Fetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the Politics of 
Reproduction, 13 FEMINIST STUD. 263, 265–271 (1987).
76. John C. Fletcher, The Fetus as Patient, 246 JAMA 772 (1981); Katherine A. Knopoff, 
Can a Pregnant Woman Morally Refuse Fetal Surgery?, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 499 (1991); 
Clare Williams, Dilemmas in Fetal Medicine: Premature Application of Technology or 
Responding to Women’s Choice?, 28 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 1 (2006).
77. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L. J.
1281, 1309–12 (1991).
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role of fetal protector has been assigned to healthcare professionals who 
may intercede on its behalf to ensure its well-being and security.78 Nev-
ertheless, as feminist sociologists Bonnie Fox and Diana Worts have ar-
gued, medicalization developed with the endorsement and encourage-
ment of communities of women, many of whom take great comfort in 
the support provided by medical institutions during pregnancy, labor, 
and delivery.79 However, women’s desire for intervention should not be 
accepted without question. Fear of a bad outcome and belief in risk 
management strategies are pervasive and embody the everyday experi-
ences of pregnancy and childbirth.80
Risk management is the process through which risks are identified, 
understood, and evaluated, and processes are enacted to attempt to alle-
viate, minimize or remove the identified risk. The success of the princi-
ples of risk management or risk alleviation rely on people “buying in” to 
fear and uncertainty.81 As attempts are made to categorize risk the num-
ber of identifiable risks are highlighted and “discovered.”82 Therefore, 
risk identification is an unfulfilled process; no one can escape the fear of 
risk or its impact. While theories of risk management are not exclusive 
to pregnancy, pregnancy is one area of life where discourse of risk is par-
ticularly pervasive. Risk and risk management strategies are constructed 
and communicated through language, practice, and modes of 
knowledge.83 While risk is often seen as value-free, using scientific 
knowledge that is presented as objective, it is actually value-laden and, 
specifically for this study, gendered.84 Risk management works through 
the governing and regulation of individuals.85 Within neoliberal society 
78. SAMANTHA HALLIDAY, AUTONOMY AND PREGNANCY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
COMPELLED OBSTETRIC INTERVENTION 1–4 (2016); Phelan, supra note 17, at 483–
85.
79. Bonnie Fox & Diana Worts, Revisiting the Critique of Medicalized Childbirth, 13 
GENDER & SOC’Y 326 (1999).
80. MARSDEN WAGNER, BORN IN THE USA: HOW A BROKEN MATERNITY SYSTEM MUST 
BE FIXED TO PUT MOTHERS AND INFANTS FIRST 104–05, 146–47, 153 (2006).
81. ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 1–8 (1992).
82. See, e.g., id. at 19–21, 39, 61, 93.
83. Id. at 45–71.
84. See, e.g., Wendy Chan & George S. Rigakos, Risk, Crime and Gender, 42 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 743 (2002); Elisabeth A. Stanko, Safety Talk: Conceptualizing Wom-
en’s Risk Assessment as a “Technology of the Soul”, 1 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 479 
(1997); Sandra Walklate, Risk And Criminal Victimization: A Modernist Dilemma?,
37 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 35 (1997).
85. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., 1991) 
(1977); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL. 2: THE USE OF 
PLEASURE (Robert Hurley trans., 1992) (1985); PAT O’MALLEY, RISK, UNCERTAINTY 
AND GOVERNMENT (2004) [hereinafter O’MALLEY, RISK]; Pat O’Malley, Uncertain 
2020] P U T T I N G  T H E  F E T U S  F IR S T 165
this state management of members of society is not primarily conducted 
through force and coercion; instead, it is encouraged through presenta-
tion of the character of the ideal neoliberal subject.86 This idealized per-
son is prudent and self-regulating, managing their own risk and absorb-
ing the cost of that risk, as opposed to society being required to provide 
social support.87 Self-regulation is conducted in line with guidance pro-
vided by “experts,” whose advice is supported through “scientific” evi-
dence.88 When an individual fails to manage their own risk, the state in-
tervenes to control and regulate their behavior through official 
sanctions.89
One of the consequences of the development of risk management 
strategies in relation to pregnancy is that there is now no such thing as a 
no-risk pregnancy.90 Undoubtedly a tension lies within the dynamic of 
pregnancy—two human subjects within one body, both potentially 
needing, and, in the case of the woman, desiring different and potential-
ly oppositional treatment or behavior. And yet, as Lealle Ruhl, a femi-
nist political and legal theorist, argues, risk management is not predom-
inantly focused upon averting maternal risk.91 Instead it is focused upon 
reducing possible risk to the fetus that may be caused by the actions of 
the pregnant woman.92 The majority of the risk regulation is achieved 
through what Ruhl defines as the “liberal governance of pregnancy,”
which enlists the cooperation of the “responsible” pregnant woman.93
Subjects: Risks, Liberalism and Contract, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y 460 (2000) [hereinafter 
O’Malley, Uncertain Subjects]; Nikolas Rose, Government and Control, 40 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 321 (2000); Nikolas Rose, Government, Authority and Expertise in Ad-
vanced Liberalism, 22 ECON. & SOC’Y 283 (1993) [hereinafter Rose, Government, Au-
thority, and Expertise]; Jonathan Simon, The Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices,
22 L. SOC. REV. 771 (1988) (developing Foucault’s theory of governmentality).
86. See O’Malley, Uncertain Subjects, supra note 85, at 465–66.
87. Id.
88. Rose, Government, Authority and Expertise, supra note 85, at 285.
89. This is done not only through criminal justice sanctions as outlined by criminological 
scholars such as O’Malley and evidenced in this Article in relation to pregnancy, but 
also through other social institutions such as child protection and removal of children 
from the care of their parents and mental health services. Id.; Harry Ferguson, Pro-
tecting Children in New Times: Child Protection and the Risk Society, 2 CHILD & FAM.
SOC. WORK 221, 223–25 (1997); Nikolas Rose, Governing Risky Individuals: The 
Role of Psychiatry in New Regimes of Control, 5 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 177, 
178–80 (1998).
90. WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 70, at 244; Ruhl, supra note 17, at 102.
91. Ruhl, supra note 17, at 95–97.
92. Id.; see also WERTZ-WERTZ, supra note 70; Deborah Lupton, Precious Cargo, 22 
CRITICAL PUB. HEALTH 329 (2012); Ilpo Helén, Technics Over Life, 33 ECON. &
SOC’Y 28 (2004).
93. Ruhl, supra note 17, at 96.
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Ruhl argues that within this context, responsibility is equated with ra-
tionality and the principle of the pregnant woman adopting behavior 
that will ensure the greatest benefit with the least risk to her unborn 
child.94 Pregnancy risk discourse is thus also moralistic, as it is based up-
on judging women’s actions against ideals of motherhood; risk and 
pregnancy cannot be understood outside of the ideal of the “good”
mother and associated behavior and beliefs.
B. Myths of Motherhood
The concept of the “good” mother is fed by what is commonly re-
ferred to in feminist literature as the “myths of motherhood.”95 A myth 
is defined as an uncontested and unconscious assumption that is so 
widely accepted that the cultural and historical origins are no longer re-
membered.96 Thus, mothering is presented as “natural” and “instinc-
tive,” rather than cultural, political, economic, and historical.97 The 
myths of motherhood maintain that to be a woman is to be a mother; 
motherhood and mothering is natural, universal, and unchanging for all 
women.98 The myths draw on the perception that women are inherently 
caring, nurturing, and self-sacrificing and that such behaviors originate 
from biology and a woman’s ability to birth children. As the feminist 
sociologist Ann Oakley argues, the myths are based on three beliefs, 
“that all women need to be mothers, that all mothers need their chil-
dren, and that all children need their mothers.”99 Furthermore, the 
myths insist that, “no woman is truly complete or fulfilled unless she has 
kids, that women remain the best primary caretakers of children, and 
that to be a remotely decent mother, a woman has to devote her entire 
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., ANN DALLY, INVENTING MOTHERHOOD (1982); ANN OAKLEY, BECOMING 
A MOTHER (1986).
96. ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES 128–45 (Annette Lavers trans. 1993) (1972).
97. SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, MOTHER NATURE: A HISTORY OF MOTHERS, INFANTS, AND 
NATURAL SELECTION 363 (2000); Carol Smart, Deconstructing Motherhood, in GOOD 
ENOUGH MOTHERING?: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON LONE MOTHERHOOD 37 (Eliz-
abeth Bortolaia Silva ed. 1996); Deirdre D. Johnston & Debra H. Swanson, Invisible 
Mothers: A Content Analysis of Motherhood Ideologies and Myths in Magazines, 49 SEX 
ROLES 21, 21 (2003).
98. Smart, supra note 97, at 37–40; Paula Caplan, Don’t Blame Mother: Then and Now,
in GENDER AND WOMEN’S STUDIES IN CANADA: CRITICAL TERRAIN, 99–100 (Mar-
garet Helen Hobbs & Carla Rice eds., 2013).
99. ANN OAKLEY, WOMAN’S WORK: THE HOUSEWIFE, PAST AND PRESENT 186 (1974).
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physical, psychological, emotional, and intellectual being, 24/7, to her 
children.”100
The myths saturate society and social and cultural interaction, set-
ting unachievable standards of perfection for women who are mothers 
while simultaneously constructing and maintaining popular beliefs that 
all women should want to be mothers and the true destiny of a woman 
is motherhood.101 These myths hold merit due to the ideologies that 
shape popular thoughts and beliefs of mothering. The dominant ideolo-
gy in a society represents that society’s dominant group: The dominant 
group in Anglo-American society is white, heterosexual, middle-class 
men. Thus, many feminists have identified the perpetuation of patriar-
chy as the underlying cause of these myths.102
The myths that motherhood is natural for women facilitate deny-
ing women identities and selfhood outside of mothering and biological 
reproduction;103 for example, women’s abilities to access equal levels of 
employment as men due to the expectation that they will stay at home 
and care for their children. Thus, many feminists have identified the 
perpetuation of patriarchy as the underlying cause of the myths.104 Clear 
evidence exists to contradict the myths that mothering is natural to 
women as not all women mother, and the nurture and care of children 
is not inevitably or exclusively completed by women.105 Feminist analy-
sis of motherhood does not lie in and of the fact that the female body 
100. SUSAN J. DOUGLAS & MEREDITH W. MICHAELS, THE MOMMY MYTH: THE 
IDEALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD AND HOW IT HAS UNDERMINED ALL WOMEN 4
(2005).
101. DALLY, supra note 95; Johnston & Swanson, supra note 97; see generally JOHN R.
GILLIS, A WORLD OF THEIR OWN MAKING 177–78 (1997); E. ANN KAPLAN,
MOTHERHOOD AND REPRESENTATION (1992).
102. Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Social Construction of Mothering: A Thematic Overview, in
MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY 1, 9 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn et 
al. eds., 1994).
103. See generally SHARON HAYS, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF MOTHERHOOD
1–19 (1996); ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE 
AND INSTITUTION 22 (1986); Jane H. Aiken, Motherhood as Misogyny, WOMEN &
LAW 19, 20–21 (2020).
104. See generally Barbara Katz Rothman, Beyond Mothers and Fathers: Ideology in a Patri-
archal Society, in MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY 139, 151–57
(Evelyn Nakano Glenn et al. eds., 1994).
105. NANCY J. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1999); NANCY J.
CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY (1989); Linda Rennie 
Forcey, Feminist Perspectives on Mothering and Peace, in MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY,
EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY 335–76 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn et al. eds. 1994); SARA
RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE (1998); Adria 
Schwartz, Taking the Nature Out of Mother, in REPRESENTATIONS OF MOTHERHOOD
240–55 (Donna Bassin et al. eds. 1994); Rothman supra note 104, at 139–57.
168 michigan  jo urn al  o f  g ender & la w [Vol. 27:149
has the capacity to conceive a child, gestate, give birth, and lactate, or 
that some women choose to partake in the nurturing and raising of 
children; instead, the issue for consideration is, “[h]ow these biological 
activities are culturally organized and given meaning.”106
The myths construct the notion of the “good” mother, someone 
who conforms to the myths, in comparison to the “bad” mother. Today 
the “good” mother is the intensive mother; defined as “child-centered, 
expert-guided, emotionally absorbing, labor-intensive, and financially 
expensive.”107 In contrast, the “bad” mother is identified by her deviant 
caregiving practices and failure to conform to the ideal. The line be-
tween “good” and “bad” mothering is not fixed or stable, rather it is 
blurred and it shifts over time and space.108 While the myths are pre-
sented as if from nowhere and no one, they are perceived to be applica-
ble everywhere and to everyone. This is particularly problematic as the 
myths are not only gendered, but also rooted in class and race.109 The 
ideal “good” mother is based upon the white, middle-class, married, 
able-bodied, heterosexual woman who has the exclusive responsibility 
for mothering her biological children, focusing her attention solely on 
their care and well-being.110 Thus, the further a woman’s identity is situ-
106. Terry Arendell, Conceiving and Investigating Motherhood: The Decade’s Scholarship, 62
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1192, 1193 (2000).
107. HAYS, supra note 103, at 8.
108. Smart, supra note 97, at 37–57; Shari Thurer, Changing Conceptions of The Good 
Mother in Psychoanalysis, 80 PSYCHOANALYTIC REV. 519 (1993).
109. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE,
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT (2000) [hereinafter 
COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT]; Anne-Marie Ambert, An International Per-
spective on Parenting: Social Change and Social Constructs, 56 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
529 (1994); Patricia Hill Collins, Shifting the Center: Race, Class, and Feminist Theo-
rizing About Motherhood, in MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY
45–66 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn et al. eds. 1994) [hereinafter Collins, Shifting the Cen-
ter]; Smart, supra note 97.
110. Glenn, supra note 102; Carol Sanger, M is For the Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN’S STUD. 15 (1992).
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ated from the perceived ideal and the greater her vulnerabilities,111 the 
harder it is for her to adhere to the myths.112
The construction of the good/bad binary has led scholars to theo-
rize a particular form of gender oppression referred to as “mother-
blame.”113 Children with problems, or children as problems, are often 
linked to the social situations of their mothers (such as poor, unmarried, 
divorced, unemployed women) rather than to the social and economic 
forces that affect children and women’s lives.114 Similarly, the feelings of 
unhappiness or dissatisfaction that women may feel as mothers are at-
tributed to the ill health or failings of the individual mother, rather than 
the social, political, cultural, and economic systems;115 a good mother is 
a happy mother. Perhaps unsurprisingly, individuals who are furthest 
from the white, middle-class mythical mother are more readily deemed 
to fail.116 As argued in this Article, when women are deemed to fail, they 
may become subject to criminal justice responses. Consequently, poor 
women, single women, young women, and women of color are policed 
most aggressively and face greater sanctions for their appearance of fail-
111. Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human 
Condition, The Essay, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 8 (2008). Fineman defines vulner-
abilities as a “universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition.” Howev-
er, as all human beings are positioned differently, our vulnerabilities range in terms of 
nature, magnitude, and potential. They are also experienced uniquely, and how we 
respond to them and are able to manage the negative consequences of our vulnerabili-
ties is dependent upon the quality and quantity of resources that we possess, have ac-
cess to, and can utilize.
112. Arline T. Geronimus, Damned If You Do: Culture, Identity, Privilege, and Teenage 
Childbearing in the United States, 57 SOC. SCI. & MED. 881 (2003); Rickie Solinger, 
Race and “Value”: Black and White Illegitimate Babies, 1945–1965, in MOTHERING:
IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY 287 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn et al. eds. 1994).
113. See generally Paula J. Caplan, Mother-Blaming, in “BAD” MOTHERS: THE POLITICS OF 
BLAME IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 127–44 (Molly Ladd-Taylor & Lauri 
Umansky eds. 1998); Paula J. Caplan & Ian Hall-McCorquodale, Mother-Blaming in 
Major Clinical Journals, 55 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 345 (1985); Anita Ilta Garey 
& Terry Arendell, Children, Work, and Family: Some Thoughts on “Mother-Blame,” in
WORKING FAMILIES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN HOME 293 (Rosan-
na Hertz & Nancy L. Marshall eds. 2001); Debra Jackson & Judy Mannix, Giving 
Voice to The Burden of Blame: A Feminist Study of Mothers’ Experiences of Mother 
Blaming, 10 INT’L J. NURSING PRAC. 150 (2004).
114. ANITA ILTA GAREY, WEAVING WORK AND MOTHERHOOD (1999); DOROTHY E.
SMITH, THE EVERYDAY WORLD AS PROBLEMATIC: A FEMINIST SOCIOLOGY (1988);
Arendell, supra note 106.
115. VERTA A. TAYLOR, ROCK-A-BY BABY: FEMINISM, SELF-HELP, AND POSTPARTUM 
DEPRESSION 1–58 (1996); Johnston & Swanson, supra note 101, at 30–31.
116. Johnston & Swanson, supra note 97, at 29–30.
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ure.117 This point will become apparent in relation to criminal justice 
responses to pregnant women deemed to fail to protect their fetus.118
One of the specific impacts of the myths of motherhood is that 
they result in a conflation between “women” and “mothers,” making 
women appear as undifferentiated and unchanging, as opposed to men 
who appear with historic specificity in a variety of roles and contexts.119
Consequently, the myths conflate actors and activities, recognizing only 
women or birth mothers as nurturers and caregivers. Furthermore, the 
myths conflate children and mothers, denying personhood and agency 
to both, and failing to acknowledge that mothers’ and children’s inter-
ests may conflict.120 The “good” mother is assumed to not be in conflict 
with her child or fetus, as, according to the myths, it is in her nature to 
put her child or fetus’s needs and well-being above her own.121
Lack of distinction between mother and child constructed through 
myths of motherhood is specifically apparent when considering 
pregnancy. The pregnant woman and the fetus are constructed as 
intertwined subjects to an even greater extent than a mother and child 
who has been born. As noted above, medical developments have 
constructed the fetus as a patient distinct from the woman whose body 
it is within.122 However, similar to the ideas promoted by the myths of 
motherhood, the responsible pregnant woman is expected to put the 
needs of her fetus before her own, while the pregnant woman who puts 
her own needs and desires first is deemed irresponsible.123 Such 
judgments on pregnant women’s behavior go beyond perceptions of 
responsibility and connect specifically with the myths of motherhood. 
The responsible pregnant woman is the “good” mother; the pregnant 
woman who does not put the needs of the fetus before her own needs 
and desires is the “bad” mother.
The pressure on women to conform to dominant ideals presented 
in the discourse of maternal responsibility is inextricably linked to the 
idea of the “responsible mother” who puts the needs of her “child”
117. See Smart, supra note 97.
118. See infra Part III.
119. Glenn, supra note 102, at 13.
120. Id.
121. RACHEL ROTH, MAKING WOMEN PAY: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF FETAL RIGHTS 6
(2000).
122. Id.; BORDO, supra note 17, at 71–98; MARTIN, supra note 74, at 54–67; Chavkin,
supra note 17, at 194; Phelan, supra note 17, at 481; Ruhl, supra note 17, at 107–09.
123. Ruhl, supra note 17, at 109–12.
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first.124 The myths of motherhood, as they operate on pregnant women 
as well as women who have had children, promote and legitimize the 
fetus-first mentality. The myths construct expectations of what it means 
to be a responsible pregnant woman and allow for, and arguably en-
courage, placing the fetus’s welfare before the welfare and needs of the 
pregnant woman and women who have a chance of becoming pregnant. 
Women are deemed to have ultimate responsibility for the fetus and 
consequently for its health and development, and so putting the needs 
of the fetus before her own is expected. Furthermore, women’s self-
regulation and sacrifice are deemed symbols of love and their roles as 
“good” mothers.125 In line with the myths of motherhood, few questions 
are raised as to whether a woman will sacrifice herself for her child and 
by extension her fetus. The construction of this expected maternal sacri-
fice legitimizes and normalizes the hierarchy of fetal and maternal health 
and well-being, and thus, the idea that the pregnant woman will act as 
the fetus’s most ardent protector.126 By extension, if she does not, then 
she is constructed as the “bad” mother, and consequently others can and 
must protect the fetus from her.127 Thus, pregnant women have become 
public figures; their bodies have become a display for others to monitor, 
touch, and comment upon in ways that would not be appropriate for 
other adult bodies.128
To conclude this Part of the Article, there is no guarantee that a 
pregnancy will end with the birth of a healthy, live-born child, and yet 
this is the expectation of society, as well as of pregnant women (follow-
ing the decision to not abort the fetus).129 Awareness that a positive out-
come to a pregnancy is not always the result130 and it is impossible to 
guarantee, is coupled with the perception that the fetus is at risk from 
124. Lupton, supra note 57, at 649; see also ROBIN GREGG, PREGNANCY IN A HIGH-TECH 
AGE: PARADOXES OF CHOICE (1995); Emma Amanda Harper & Geneviève Rail, 
“Gaining the Right Amount for My Baby”: Young Pregnant Women’s Discursive 
Constructions of Health, 21 HEALTH SOC. REV. 69 (2012); Michelle R. H. van 
Mulken et al., The Stigmatisation of Pregnancy: Societal Influences on Pregnant 
Women’s Physical Activity Behaviour, 18 CULTURE HEALTH & SEXUALITY 921 (2016).
125. Harper & Rail, supra note 124, at 74–75.
126. See Danielle Bessett, Negotiating Normalization: The Perils of Producing Pregnancy 
Symptoms in Prenatal Care, 71 SOC. SCI. & MED. 370 (2010).
127. HALLIDAY, supra note 78, at 168–69.
128. Lupton, supra note 92, at 332; see also Nathan Stormer, Prenatal Space, 26 SIGNS 109 
(2000).
129. Lyerly et al., supra note 15.
130. At least one in four pregnancies end in a miscarriage. Miscarriage Statistics, TOMMY’S,
https://www.tommys.org/our-organisation/charity-research/pregnancy-statistics/
miscarriage (last visited Feb. 8, 2020).
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external factors as well as from the pregnant woman’s behavior. As such, 
perception that the fetus is always at risk is now a central aspect of mon-
itoring and intervention in pregnancy; this monitoring and intervention 
is most visibly conducted by the medical community. In the UK and 
US, pregnant women are screened for their levels of cigarette smoking, 
drug use, and alcohol consumption, with the message clearly focused on 
doing what’s best for the “baby.”131 However, it is not only the medical 
community who monitor and intervene when a pregnant woman is per-
ceived to be an unacceptable risk to the fetus. Examples in both the UK 
and the US of doctors seeking court rulings to conduct a Caesarean sec-
tion against the will of the pregnant woman illustrate that members of 
the legal community, in conjunction with or at the behest of members 
of the health community, are keen to do all that they can to protect the 
fetus.132 At times such protection is given in spite of the damage it may 
cause the pregnant woman, both physically and mentally. However, as 
evidenced by the cases analyzed in this Article, the fetus-first mentality is 
rooted not only in the minds of medics and wider society, but also law 
enforcers—including the police, prosecutors, the judiciary, and lawmak-
ers. As the cases examined below illustrate, the desire to protect the fetus 
has a strong influence on responses to women deemed to pose risks to 
the fetus and to embody the “bad” mother.
III. Fetus-first Mentality in Action
As argued in the previous Part, the fetus-first mentality is en-
trenched in social and cultural life. In this Part, I will outline the extent 
to which the mentality is impacting criminal law. To illustrate this 
point, I draw on two examples of behavior—killing of the fetus (feti-
cide) and consuming controlled substances while pregnant—which out-
line how the fetus-first mentality has influenced the development and 
application of laws in response to women’s behavior. I provide cases 
from Alabama and Indiana in the US, and England in the UK. What 
becomes clear from these cases is that the desire to protect the fetus and 
to punish women who failed to put the fetus first has resulted in the de-
velopment of new laws as well as old laws being stretched beyond the 
original intent of enacting legislators. Such adaption of law is not un-
common in criminal law and is arguably a natural development of law 
131. See supra notes 7–9.
132. See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en banc); St. George’s Healthcare 
N.H.S. Trust v. S. [1999] Fam 26 (CA) (appeal taken from Eng.).
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in common law jurisdictions. However, the influence of the fetus-first 
mentality on the development of law has numerous consequences for 
both women and their fetuses, as will be outlined in the Part V of this 
Article.
A. Feticide
Killing a child is often seen as one of the most heinous crimes a 
person can commit.133 The killing of a fetus, an unborn child, is seen by 
many to be an equally hideous crime. Moral and legal debates about 
abortion continue to rage over 45 years after Roe v. Wade134 declared 
outright abortion bans by US states unconstitutional and the Abortion 
Act 1967135 removed the criminal sanctions for abortion in England and 
Wales. A person’s belief as to whether an abortion is the killing of a 
child will depend upon the position they take in terms of when life be-
133. This is particularly the case when women kill their own children, as considerable re-
search has noted that women can be judged extremely harshly when they commit fili-
cide, due, in part, to the perception that the behavior is “unnatural” for women and 
mothers. Women are alternately presented as being “mad,” an explanation that is of-
ten given to support the use of criminal offenses such as infanticide in England and 
Wales, as well as other jurisdictions that have such criminal offenses. See generally
MICHELLE OBERMAN & CHERYL L. MEYER, WHEN MOTHERS KILL: INTERVIEWS 
FROM PRISON (2008); Susan Ayres, “[N]ot a Story to Pass On”: Constructing Mothers 
Who Kill, 15 HASTINGS WOMENS L.J. 39 (2004); Karen Brennan, Murdering Mothers 
and Gentle Judges: Paternalism, Patriarchy and Infanticide, 30 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
139 (2018); Arlie Loughnan, The “Strange” Case of the Infanticide Doctrine, 32 OXF.
J. LEGAL STUD. 685 (2012); Emma Milne & Jackie Turton, Understanding Violent 
Women, in WOMEN AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FAILING VICTIMS AND 
OFFENDERS? 119 (Emma Milne et al. eds., 2018).
134. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
135. Abortion Act 1967, c. 87, § 1 (Gr. Brit.). The Abortion Act provides exemption 
from prosecution under section 58 of the Offenses Against the Person Act if the abor-
tion is performed by a registered medical practitioner in specific therapeutic circum-
stances, whereby two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion that “the 
pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the continuance of the 
pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, or inju-
ry to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of 
her family,” or “the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the 
physical or mental health of the pregnant woman,” or “continuance of the pregnancy 
would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, greater than if the pregnancy 
were terminated,” or “that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it 
would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handi-
capped.”
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gins and the morality of abortion,136 a discussion which is beyond the 
scope of this Article. Nevertheless, public support for post-viability 
abortions is noted to be lower than for pre-viability terminations.137
Consequently, abortions that take place in the later gestational stage of 
pregnancy are often deemed to be more morally dubious, and criminal 
laws prohibiting or restricting abortion in both the US and the UK are 
most often structured towards the post-viability stages.138 Criminal law 
distinguishes between an abortion, the ending of a pregnancy, and feti-
cide, the killing of a fetus. However, as will be outlined in the two cases 
136. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION AND 
EUTHANASIA (1993); CLARICE FEINMAN, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF A WOMAN’S
BODY (1992); BONNIE STEINBOCK, LIFE BEFORE BIRTH: THE MORAL AND LEGAL 
STATUS OF EMBRYOS AND FETUSES (2d ed. 2011); ANN FUREDI, THE MORAL CASE 
FOR ABORTION (2016); H. Tristram Engelhardt, The Ontology of Abortion, 84 
ETHICS 217 (1974); John Finnis, The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply to Judith 
Thomson, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 117 (1973); Robert E. Joyce, Personhood and the Con-
ception Event, 52 NEW SCHOLASTICISM 97 (1978); John Thomas Noonan, An Almost 
Absolute Value in History, in THE MORALITY OF ABORTION: LEGAL AND HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 1 (John Thomas Noonan ed., 1970); Rosamund Scott, Choosing Be-
tween Possible Lives: Legal and Ethical ISSUES in Prenatal Screening and Preimplanta-
tion Genetic Diagnosis, 26 OXF. J. LEGAL STUD. 153 (2006); Michael Tooley, Abor-
tion and Infanticide, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 37 (1972); Mary Anne Warren, On the 
Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, 57 MONIST 43 (1973).
137. A 2011 YouGov poll reported that seventy-six percent of Britons believe abortion 
should be legal in most or all circumstances, with only two percent believing abortion 
should always be legal. Hannah Thompson & Anthony Wells, Abortion Row, 
YOUGOV (Sept. 6, 2011, 3:58 PM), https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-
reports/2011/09/06/abortion-row.  A further poll conducted in 2013 concluded that 
only six percent of people wanted to increase the gestation limit for abortion above 
24 weeks, with forty percent agreeing to keep the limit at 24 weeks and twenty-eight 
percent wishing to reduce the limit to below 24 weeks. Andrew Farmer, Opinions on 
Abortion, YOUGO (Feb. 14, 2013, 6:49 AM), https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/
articles-reports/2013/02/14/opinions-abortion. A Gallup poll in the US found that 
while sixty percent of Americans support legalized abortion in early pregnancy, only 
twenty-eight percent support abortion in the second trimester and thirteen percent in 
the third. Sarah McCammom, Americans’ Support For Abortion Rights Wanes As Preg-
nancy Progresses, NPR (June 13, 2018, 3:08 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/13/
619200865/americans-support-for-abortion-rights-wanes-as-pregnancy-
progresses?t=1576933749800.
138. Developments in the US since the election of Donald Trump to the presidency and 
changes in the leanings of the Supreme Court have resulted in a number of states 
making changes to their abortion laws, creating almost total bans, with the aims of a 
court challenge being initiated that will allow the case to progress up to the Supreme 
Court and potentially result in Roe v. Wade being overturned. See, e.g., H.B. 314, 
2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2019). For information about the impact of such laws, see 
Abortion Laws in the US – 10 Things You Need To Know, AMNESTY INT’L (June 11, 
2019, 5:35 PM), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/abortion-laws-in-
the-us-10-things-you-need-to-know/.
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presented, the move towards the fetus-first mentality has blurred the 
lines between the two offenses. The cases discussed are those of Hayley 
from England, UK, and Purvi Patel from Indiana, US. Both women 
purchased and took medication to end a pregnancy after the fetus had 
reached the point of viability.
1. Hayley—England, UK139
Hayley was convicted of procuring a miscarriage after she ordered 
misoprostol over the internet and consumed the substance in the late 
stages of her pregnancy. The drug is used to start labor and expel the fe-
tus from the uterus.140 Hayley pleaded guilty to a charge of procuring a 
miscarriage and was sentenced to eight years imprisonment. During the 
sentencing hearing, the prosecution contended that Hayley took the 
misoprostol at or close to the full-term of gestation of her pregnancy. As 
noted above, in England and Wales it is a criminal offense for anyone, 
including the pregnant woman, to end a woman’s pregnancy at any 
stage of gestation unless conducted within the confines of the Abortion 
Act 1967.141 Procuring a miscarriage criminalizes the ending of a preg-
nancy rather than the killing of the fetus.142 Therefore, Hayley’s convic-
tion is not specifically for the behavior of or intention to kill the fetus, 
but rather her act of ending her pregnancy. Thus, she was convicted of 
an illegal abortion, not a crime against the fetus such as child destruc-
tion. In spite of Hayley’s conviction for an illegal abortion, the judge in 
Hayley’s case equated her actions to murder several times during her 
sentencing hearing. The judge argued that Hayley’s behavior was be-
tween unintentional manslaughter and murder in terms of seriousness:
This is not charged as murder, and I would be wrong to treat 
it as such, as a matter of law. Equally it is not manslaughter, 
139. “Hayley” is not the defendant’s real name. While the case was heard in open court, 
where her name was published, I have anonymized the case in line with requirements 
imposed by the court to view the case. The anonymization is of the identity of the 
defendant and all other parties involved in the case and includes withholding details 
such as class, exact age, ethnicity, geographical location, and the court in which the 
case was heard. As such no citations to the case are provided in this analysis.
140. Rebecca Allen & Barbara M. O’Brien, Uses of Misoprostol in Obstetrics and Gynecolo-
gy, 2 REVS. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 159, 159 (2009).
141. Abortion Act 1967, c. 87, § 1 (Gr. Brit.).
142. The offense will still be committed even if the fetus survives in utero or is expelled 
alive and survives post-birth. R. v. Cramp [1880] 5 QBD 307 (appeal taken from 
Eng. & Wales).
176 michigan  jo urn al  o f  g ender & la w [Vol. 27:149
nor is it akin to it, because the termination here was deliber-
ately caused with a view to terminating the life of an unborn 
child. It is not akin to causing death by dangerous driving ei-
ther, with its maximum sentence of 14 years, but once again 
I have to bear in mind the nature of the calculated intention-
ality here. As matters stand in English law, none of those of-
fenses could be committed in relation to an unborn child, 
but the seriousness of the criminality here is that, at whatever 
stage life can be said to begin, the child in the womb was so 
near to birth that in my judgment all right thinking people 
would consider this offense more serious than that of unin-
tentional manslaughter or any offense on the calendar other 
than murder.
At several times during the hearing the judge refers to the fetus as a 
child, including stating that “[t]his is a child who, on the face of it, pro-
spectively was capable of being born alive in the next few days . . .”, thus 
further equating Hayley’s actions to the killing of a live-born child. 
Moreover, Hayley was initially sentenced to 12 years imprisonment,
which was reduced by the Court of Appeal, who judged that Hayley’s 
culpability lay in her “extinguishing of a life about to begin.”
The rhetoric from both hearings indicates that the focus was upon 
Hayley’s actions of ending the life of the fetus rather than on ending her 
pregnancy. The distinction is significant as Hayley took the misoprostol 
at full-term or very close to full term, which means it is possible that the 
child was born alive. Hayley refused to reveal the location of the infant’s
body, and the inability to locate the dead body made it impossible to 
determine if the child was born alive. Without concrete evidence of live 
or stillbirth, alternative offenses were unable to be used to criminalize 
Hayley’s actions—homicide offenses (murder, manslaughter, or infanti-
cide) and child destruction. As noted, homicide is reserved for humans 
with legal personality, so it would have been necessary for the prosecu-
tion to prove the child lived a separate existence and then died.143 Child 
destruction requires the opposite, for a child to die before it has 
achieved a separate existence.144 The judge in Hayley’s sentencing hear-
ing questioned why child destruction had not been used, while noting it 
143. See supra text accompanying notes 18–24.
144. Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5 c. 34 (Eng. & Wales).
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has the same gravity as procuring a miscarriage.145 During the sentencing
hearing, the prosecution barrister advised that child destruction was not 
possible due to the inability to prove stillbirth. Thus, not having the 
child’s body as evidence for the case limited the available offenses that 
the prosecutors could draw upon to convict Hayley of a crime. As a con-
sequence, the prosecutors used procuring a miscarriage, an offense pro-
hibiting the ending of a pregnancy.
While the distinction between ending a pregnancy and ending the 
life of a fetus may appear to be a matter of semantics, it has some very 
real consequences for the principle behind and application of the law. 
As noted above, the born-alive rule prevents a fetus from being a victim 
of homicide.146 And yet, application of the offense of procuring a mis-
carriage in Hayley’s case appears to be on the basis of criminalizing Hay-
ley’s behavior of killing her fetus rather than ending her pregnancy. As a 
consequence, procuring a miscarriage is being used as a proxy homicide 
offense, like feticide, capturing the killing of a human in utero or during 
labor and delivery. To appreciate the significance of using the offense in 
this manner, it is important to look at the historical background of the 
offense as well as the contemporary context of legal regulation of abor-
tion.
Procuring a miscarriage first became a statutory offense in 1803.147
However, there is debate within the historical scholarship as to whether 
a woman could be held criminally liable for ending her own pregnancy 
prior to the 1861 enactment of the Offenses Against the Person Act. 
The historian John Keown has argued that section 58 of the Act only 
clarified that the law could be applied to pregnant women who self-
aborted, which had always been a common law offense.148 Bernard 
Dickens, another historian, notes that it is not possible to confirm this 
argument due to the infrequency with which women were prosecuted 
for self-abortion.149 Other scholars have argued that statutes regulating 
abortion enacted before 1861 were more concerned with criminalizing 
individuals who caused the death of a woman due to the performance of 
an abortion, rather than criminalizing the act of abortion itself. As histo-
rian Angus McLaren argues, the wording of the 1803 law related to 
145. Both offenses have a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Offenses Against the 
Person Act 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c.100, § 58 (Eng. & Wales); Infant Life (Preserva-
tion) Act 1928, 19 & 20 Geo. 5 c. 34, § 1 (Eng. & Wales).
146. Supra text accompanying note 18.
147. Malicious Shooting or Stabbing Act 1803, 43 Geo. 3 c. 58 (Eng., Wales, & Ire.).
148. JOHN KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS AND THE LAW: SOME ASPECTS OF THE LEGAL 
REGULATION OF ABORTION IN ENGLAND FROM 1803 TO 1982 34 (1988).
149. BERNARD M. DICKENS, ABORTION AND THE LAW 20–28 (1966).
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post-quickening abortion, “thereby to murder, or thereby to cause and 
procure the miscarriage of any woman,”150 suggests that abortion was 
seen as another form of murder in which the woman, not the fetus, was 
the victim.151 Limited parliamentary debate occurred with the passing of 
the Offenses Against the Person Act 1861,152 so it is unclear why preg-
nant women were named as potential offenders under this law, which 
still operates today. Generally, the literature agrees that the historical 
purpose of the law was to prevent or condemn harm from coming to 
pregnant women and the intentional destruction of fetal life;153 never-
theless, historian Glanville Williams argues that the former purpose was 
of most importance, as the concern was not for the unborn child, but 
for the injury done to women as a result of the actions of an unskilled 
abortion provider.154
Beyond the historic legacy of the offense of procuring a miscar-
riage, contemporary debate about legal regulation of abortion further 
draws into question the suitability of using the offense to punish Hay-
ley’s behavior. The continued regulation of abortion within criminal law 
has come under political, academic, and public scrutiny in recent years, 
spearheaded by a campaign for decriminalization.155 In March 2017, a 
Private Members Bill to repeal section 58 of the Offenses Against the 
Person Act 1861 passed the first reading in Parliament but failed to pro-
gress to a second reading due to the calling of the 2017 General Elec-
tion.156 In academic literature the case for removal of abortion from 
150. Malicious Shooting or Stabbing Act, 1803, 43 Geo. 3c. 58 (Eng., Wales, & Ire.).
151. ANGUS MCLAREN, REPRODUCTIVE RITUALS: THE PERCEPTION OF FERTILITY IN 
ENGLAND FROM THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 128–29
(1984). Quickening is the point at which a woman first feels the fetus move inside, 
typically 15–17 gestational weeks. Id. at 107–11.
152. MALCOLM POTTS ET AL., ABORTION 281–82 (1977).
153. Id.; DICKENS, supra note 149; KEOWN, supra note 148.
154. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 146 (1957).
155. The coalition, WE TRUST WOMEN, http://www.wetrustwomen.org.uk/the-coalition.
(last visited June 11, 2019). We Trust Women is a campaign to decriminalize 
abortion across the UK, led by the British Pregnancy Advisory Service and supported 
by a range of women’s rights groups, reproductive rights campaigners, and profes-
sional bodies, including the Royal College of Midwives, Women’s Aid, Fawcett Soci-
ety, Maternity Action, the British Society of Abortion Care Providers, Birthrights, 
Lawyers for Choice, End Violence Against Women, Equality Now, IPPF European 
Network, Voice for Choice, Southall Black Sisters, Alliance for Choice NI, and Doc-
tors for a Woman’s Choice on Abortion.
156. MPs Approve an Early General Election, PARLIAMENT.UK (Apr. 19, 2017), 
https://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2017/april/mps-to-vote-on-an-early-
general-election/; PMBs at End of a Session, UK PARLIAMENT,
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criminal law has most recently been made by Sally Sheldon, a feminist 
legal scholar, who argues that reading the Offenses Against the Person 
Act 1861 in conjunction with the Abortion Act 1967 does not result in 
the law expressing that abortion is a moral wrong at any stage of gesta-
tion.157 Instead the law criminalizes the ending of a pregnancy (and like-
ly the ending of the fetus’s life) when that abortion is conducted outside 
of the Abortion Act 1967.158 The law considers the termination of a 
pregnancy a serious wrong when not carried out under medical supervi-
sion “in line with the best medical practice of the 1960s” when abortion 
could only be conducted through medical procedure (rather than medi-
cation), and illegal abortions posed significant health risks to pregnant 
women.159 Furthermore, the law requires two doctors to determine 
whether an abortion should go ahead and will not be legal if two doctors 
do not agree. This is significant as it means that a woman does not have 
a right to an abortion, instead she only has the right to ask two doctors 
if they will give her permission to have that abortion. Within this opera-
tional context, the Abortion Act provides “socially acceptable” reasons 
why a woman would be allowed to discontinue a pregnancy.160 The 
message of the law is one of medical paternalism, as women are deemed 
to be relatively incapable of making a morally significant decision about 
pregnancy.161 Sheldon has long argued that the law has always refused to 
recognize that women have a fundamental right to decide to terminate a 
pregnancy.162 Instead the law advocates that doctors are the best people 
to determine if a woman should be allowed an abortion.163 This legal 
regulation is out of step with women being autonomous people with the 
capacity and rights to make decisions about their bodies.164
While abortions obtained outside of the parameters of the Abor-
tion Act 1967 are illegal, there have been very few prosecutions despite 
https://guidetoprocedure.parliament.uk/articles/3Jzklt7n/pmbs-at-end-of-a-session
(last visited Mar. 11, 2020).
157. See Sheldon, supra note 23.
158. Abortion Act 1967, c. 87, § 1 (Gr. Brit.); Offenses Against the Person Act 1861, 24
& 25 Vict. c. 100, § 58 (Eng. & Wales).
159. Sheldon, supra note 23, at 356.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Sally Sheldon, “Who Is the Mother to Make The Judgment?”: The Constructions of 
Woman in English Abortion Law, 1 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 3 (1993).
163. See generally SALLY SHELDON, BEYOND CONTROL: MEDICAL POWER AND ABORTION 
LAW (1997) (reflecting that the Abortion Act recognizes an important role for doc-
tors as gatekeepers to abortion services).
164. Sheldon, supra note 23, at 356–58.
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indication that numerous women commit this offense every year.165 Evi-
dence of seizures of abortifacients being delivered by mail to women 
across the UK would suggest that numerous women are procuring their 
own miscarriages outside of medical guidance without facing criminal 
charges.166 Similarly, in support of her Bill to decriminalize abortion, 
Member of Parliament Diana Johnson presented comments from wom-
en who illegally obtained and consumed abortifacients from the organi-
zation Women on the Web, none of whom have faced criminal prosecu-
tion.167 There are numerous reasons why a prosecution may not go 
forward, including that the police may be unaware that the offense is be-
ing committed and that evidence may be limited. Nevertheless, the abil-
ity to track mail and internet searches would facilitate a prosecution for, 
at the very least, procuring an abortifacient,168 if not for an illegal abor-
tion. It appears, however, that there is little appetite to prosecute wom-
en seeking early medical abortions through illegal means. This is per-
haps illustrated by the public outcry following the prosecution of a 
woman in Northern Ireland for purchasing abortion medication via the 
internet.169 As Sheldon argues, prosecutions tend to be reserved for ter-
minations of pregnancies in the very late stages of gestation and noncon-
sensual abortions (often involving a third party attacking a pregnant 
woman).170 Lack of prosecutions of women who terminate non-viable 
pregnancies, which still kills a fetus, would suggest that the criminal law 
serves no purpose in regulating such action. As Sheldon concludes, 
criminal controls on abortion are outdated and out of step with modern 
medical science, serving to hinder clinical best practices.171 Furthermore, 
Sheldon argues the law stigmatizes women who need abortions, impos-
ing clinically unwarranted and bureaucratic restrictions on medical prac-
165. See Sheldon, supra note 23, at 342–44, 349.
166. Jane Kirby, Women Turning to Illegal Abortion Pills in Rising Numbers, Charity Warns,
INDEPENDENT (Feb. 15, 2017, 1:17 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/
home-news/abortion-pill-access-online-illegal-decriminalise-woman-british-
pregnancy-advisory-service-danger-a7580566.html.
167. 623 Parl Deb HC (6th Ser.) (2017) col. 26–28 (UK).
168. In England and Wales, procuring drugs to cause an abortion is a criminal offense. 
Offenses Against the Person Act 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, § 59 (Eng. & Wales).
169. Belfast Protest Against Prosecution of Northern Ireland Woman who Used Abortion 




170. Sheldon, supra note 23, at 339-40.
171. Id. at 356.
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tice with no evidence to suggest that it impacts the number of abortions 
that take place each year.
While there may be limited public and criminal justice appetite to 
prosecute women who illegally terminate pregnancies prior to viability, 
support for a woman’s right to choose to terminate a pregnancy receives 
less public support when the fetus is capable of being born alive.172 In 
Hayley’s case, her pregnancy was so far-advanced that she could have 
naturally given birth to a living child. It is possible that following con-
sumption of the misoprostol the child may well have been born alive, as 
the drug begins the process of labor rather than killing the fetus. If the 
body had been located and live birth had been proven, then Hayley may 
have faced a murder charge even if she had not intentionally committed 
an act or omission that resulted in the child’s death once it was born 
alive—the action of taking the misoprostol may have been enough to 
indicate intent for murder and so result a homicide conviction.173
My aim in reviewing the history of the offense of abortion and the 
current context of women’s procurement of miscarriages (legal and ille-
gal) is to argue that application of this law in Hayley’s case indicates the 
influence of the fetus-first mentality. In the strictest sense of the law and 
interpretation of the offense of procuring a miscarriage, Hayley did en-
gage in the intentional termination of a pregnancy; she acted outside of 
the authorization for abortion provided by the Abortion Act 1967, and 
so taking misoprostol was illegal. However, this does not mean that we 
should understand and interpret Hayley’s actions as an abortion, or that 
use of the offense of procuring a miscarriage is the correct means to 
criminalize her behavior, if indeed criminalization is appropriate. When 
we consider the characteristics of legal abortions that occur in England 
and Wales, this case is not comparable to “typical” abortions. Abortion 
is a common medical procedure that one in three women in the UK will 
experience at least once in her lifetime.174 The vast majority of termina-
tions, nine in ten, are carried out at 12 weeks of gestation or less, and
172. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
173. See Att’y Gen. Reference (No.3 of 1994) [1998] AC 245 (HL) (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (indicating that homicide offense may have been committed if a child is born 
alive and dies of injuries deliberately inflicted while in utero); EMMA CAVE, THE 
MOTHER OF ALL CRIMES: HUMAN RIGHTS, CRIMINALIZATION AND THE CHILD 
BORN ALIVE 72–74 (2004).
174. Abortion, NHS, https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/abortion/ (last updated Aug. 17, 
2016).
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eighty percent are conducted before the tenth week.175 Abortions that 
occurred at or after the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy (the point of 
viability) totaled 289 in 2018, 0.1 percent of the legal abortions that oc-
curred.176 As per the Abortion Act 1967, these abortions would have oc-
curred to save the life of the pregnant woman, to prevent grave perma-
nent mental or physical injury to the pregnant woman, or due to fetal 
abnormalities.
Due to the difference between Hayley’s case and a “typical” abor-
tion, Hayley’s actions should not be seen as procuring a miscarriage but 
as an attempt to kill her child—either while it was in utero or following 
birth. As I have argued, homicide is precisely the offense the prosecution 
and judge at Hayley’s trial appear to be aiming to achieve by using the 
offense of procuring a miscarriage, but the limits of the application of 
homicide in English law has prevented this. Consequently, prosecutors 
have drawn on the law of abortion to punish Hayley for behavior they 
believe she has committed but cannot prove; and to convict her despite 
the lack of legal doctrine to support such a conviction. The prosecu-
tion’s decision to apply legislation prohibiting abortion reflects the fe-
tus-first mentality. The desire to convict Hayley of an offense despite 
the inapplicability of existing homicide laws resulted in prosecutors 
drawing on other available offenses. While some may argue the creativi-
ty of prosecutors is admirable and precisely what the Crown Prosecution 
Service should be doing to ensure justice for the fetus that could have 
been born alive through natural birth, such application of law stretches 
the principles of homicide law in England and Wales and so reflects a 
clear movement towards a fetus-first mentality.
2. Purvi Patel—Indiana, US
In 2013, Purvi Patel purchased mifepristone and misoprostol177
online and consumed the drugs to terminate her pregnancy at home.178
175. U.K. DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. CARE, ABORTION STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND 
WALES: 2018 12 (2019), https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/abortion-
statistics-for-england-and-wales-2018.
176. Id.
177. See generally Mifepristone (Mifeprex), MEDLINEPLUS, https://medlineplus.gov/
druginfo/meds/a600042.html (last updated May 15, 2016) (noting that mifepristone 
causes the placenta to separate from the endometrium and so effectively kills the fetus 
in utero); supra note 136 (misoprostol starts labor, expelling the fetus from the uter-
us).
178. Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d. 1041, 1043 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
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The gestational stage of her pregnancy was 25 to 30 weeks at the time.179
Patel left the body of the aborted fetus in a dumpster near her family’s 
restaurant.180 After she experienced substantial bleeding, she went to a 
hospital emergency room for medical assistance.181 She advised a doctor 
that she had been 10 to 12 weeks pregnant and had missed two peri-
ods.182 However, based on the size of the umbilical cord still inside her 
body and a physical examination, the doctor estimated she had been at 
least 25 or 26 weeks pregnant.183
The doctors pressed Patel to tell them the location of the aborted 
fetus.184 After she revealed the location, they notified law enforcement 
and left the hospital with the aim of saving its life.185 The body was 
found by law enforcement officers. A doctor examined it onsite and 
concluded that prior to birth the fetus was viable, appeared normal and 
healthy, and had developed to approximately 30 gestational weeks.186
When questioned by police, Patel stated that she did not perform CPR 
on the aborted fetus because it was not moving and did not cry.187 The 
forensic pathologist concluded that prior to birth the fetus had reached 
approximately 25 gestational weeks and “more likely than not” was born 
alive and had breathed after birth.188 However, it should be noted that 
the conclusion of live birth was made after performing a lung floating 
test which has been noted to be unreliable.189 Forensic pathologist Dr. 
Joseph Prahlow concluded that “the possible mechanisms of death were 
‘extreme prematurity’” coupled with a lack of essential medical care, hy-
pothermia or hyperthermia due to the aborted fetus’s inability to regu-
late its body temperature, loss of blood due to the severed umbilical 
cord, or asphyxia from being placed in a plastic bag or from items inside 
the bag that could cover its mouth and nose.”190
Patel was charged with the class A felony neglect of a dependent.191
The prosecutors alleged that Patel failed to provide any medical care for 
her aborted fetus immediately after its birth and this failure resulted in 
179. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1043.
180. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1046.
181. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1046.
182. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1046.
183. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1046.
184. Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d. 1041, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)
185. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1046.
186. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1046.
187. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1047.
188. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1047.
189. Patel, 60 N.E. 3d at 1047 n.6.
190. Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d. 1041, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
191. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1048.
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death.192 Later, she was also charged with feticide, a class B felony; the 
prosecutors alleged that Patel knowingly terminated her pregnancy with 
an intention other than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead fe-
tus.193 At trial, Patel was found guilty as charged; she was sentenced to 
imprisonment for thirty years for neglect of a dependent, with twenty 
years executed and ten years suspended.194 She was also sentenced to a 
concurrent executed term of six years for feticide.195 In 2016 she ap-
pealed both convictions.196
Patel appealed her neglect conviction by alleging that the State 
failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove the conviction beyond a 
reasonable doubt.197 At the time of the events, an individual committed 
neglect if, “having the care of a dependent, whether assumed voluntarily 
or because of a legal obligation, [they] knowingly or intentional-
ly . . . place the dependent in a situation that endangers the dependent’s 
life or health.”198 If that neglect results in the death of the child, then the 
individual has committed a class A felony.199 The basis of Patel’s neglect 
charge was that she knowingly placed the baby in danger by failing to 
provide any medical care immediately after birth.200 Patel’s appeal cen-
tered on the causation element of the class A felony, which required 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that her actions resulted in the death 
of the child.201 The Court of Appeals agreed with Patel. It ruled that the 
State failed to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the baby’s death 
could not have occurred but for Patel’s failure to provide medical care 
immediately after its birth.”202 While Patel’s acts of deliberately inducing 
labor and giving birth without medical assistance were deemed to put 
her fetus in a dangerous situation, the offense of neglect only applied to 
a child born alive.203 The Court stated, “. . . the plain language of the 
neglect statute ‘contemplates only acts that place one who is a depend-
192. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1048.
193. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1048.
194. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1048.
195. Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d. 1041, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
196. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1048.
197. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1048–55.
198. IND. CODE. § 35–46–1–4(a)(1) (2019).
199. Id at § 4(b).
200. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1048. As Patel accepted that the aborted fetus was born alive I 
refer to the aborted fetus as a “baby” or “child” for the remainder of the case analysis. 
However, Patel’s case illustrates the challenges of determining language when fetuses 
die just prior, during, or shortly after birth.
201. Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d. 1041, 1048–55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
202. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1052.
203. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1055.
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ent at the time of the conduct at issue in a dangerous situation—not 
acts that place a future dependent in a dangerous situation.’”204 Conse-
quently, it was only her postpartum behavior that could be considered 
neglectful. Testimony against Patel was only able to establish that there 
was a possibility, rather than a certainty, that Patel’s baby would have 
lived but for her failure to provide medical care immediately after birth. 
As such, Patel’s conviction for a class A felony of neglect of a dependent 
was vacated.205 She was convicted of a class D felony of neglect instead, 
as the State had proven that she knowingly endangered her baby.206 This 
felony was punishable by imprisonment for six months up to three 
years.207
Patel also appealed her feticide conviction on the basis that the 
statute did not apply to her conduct.208 At the time of the termination 
of Patel’s pregnancy, the feticide offense read: “A person who knowingly 
or intentionally terminates a human pregnancy with an intention other 
than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead fetus commits feticide, 
a Class B felony.”209 First, Patel appealed on the grounds that the offense 
of feticide requires the fetus to die, but her child was born alive. The 
Court of Appeal disagreed with this point, arguing that the plain lan-
guage of the statute indicated otherwise.210 However, they did note that 
the language of the feticide statute has constructed “. . . the apparently 
absurd outcome [of] a woman being convicted under both the neglect 
of a dependent statute, which requires a live infant, and the feticide 
statute, which does not require a dead infant.”211
Patel further appealed the conviction on the basis that her actions 
were not an act of feticide, but an illegal abortion.212 Patel maintained 
that the feticide statute was not the law that “govern[ed] unlawful abor-
tions; rather, unlawful abortions are governed by the Unlawful Abortion
Statute, Ind. Code §16–34–2–7.”213 The Court of Appeals ruled that 
the state legislature had purposefully drawn a clear distinction between 
feticide and illegal abortion. It noted that since enactment in 1979, the 
204. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1053 (citing Herron v. State, 729 N.E.2d. 1008, 1011 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2000)).
205. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1055.
206. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1055.
207. IND. CODE. § 35–46–1–4 (2019).
208. Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d. 1041, 1055–62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
209. IND. CODE. § 35–46–1–4 (2019).
210. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1055.
211. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1056.
212. Patel, 60 N.E. 3d at 1056–57.
213. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1057.
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feticide statute had been used to prosecute third parties who knowingly 
terminated pregnancies without the consent of the pregnant woman, of-
ten through use of violence targeted at the woman.214 Patel’s case was 
believed to be the first case of the government using the feticide offense 
to prosecute a pregnant woman or anyone else for performing an illegal 
abortion.215
Patel further contended that the legislation prohibiting abortions 
not performed under certain specified circumstances was intended to 
punish medical professionals, not women who performed their own 
abortions.216 The Court of Appeals agreed with Patel’s argument and ac-
cordingly overturned her feticide conviction, concluding that the legisla-
ture never intended for the feticide statute to apply to pregnant wom-
en.217 As such, Patel’s case was remanded to the trial court for 
resentencing for her conviction of class D felony neglect of a depend-
ent.218 She was sentenced to imprisonment for 18 months; due to time 
already served, Patel was released immediately.219
Patel’s initial convictions of both a class A felony neglect of a de-
pendent and a class B felony of feticide are examples of the fetus-first 
mentality. The prosecutors interpreted preexisting laws to obtain a con-
viction in order to punish the behavior of a pregnant woman towards 
her unborn child, as they deemed this behavior unacceptable. As with 
Hayley’s case, the prosecution found ways within existing legislation to 
illustrate the perceived wrongfulness of the behavior. Unlike Hayley’s 
case, the interpretation of the law—notably the feticide offense—which 
went beyond the intent of the state legislature was overturned on appeal. 
While Indiana recognizes the fetus as a person able to be the victim of 
homicide,220 the penal code protects pregnant women from facing pros-
ecution for ending the life of the fetus through an illegal abortion; in 
contrast, under English law, the fetus is not recognized as a distinct legal 
subject, and so cannot be a victim of homicide, but women can be held 
214. Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d. 1041, 1057–60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
215. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1058.
216. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1060–62.
217. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1060–62.
218. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1062.
219. Judge Says Purvi Patel Should Be Freed Immediately After Feticide Conviction Over-
turned, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 31, 2016, 10:19 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/2016/sep/01/purvi-patel-freed-immediately-feticide-conviction-overturned.
220. See IND. CODE § 35–42–1–1(4)(2019) (“A person who knowingly or intentionally 
kills a fetus in any stage of development commits murder, a felony.”).
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criminally liable for an illegal abortion or attempting to end the life of 
the fetus capable of being born alive.221
Nevertheless, the fact that the state brought charges against Patel 
and secured a conviction illustrates their desire to punish her for behav-
ior deemed to be unacceptable as a pregnant woman. Prosecutors were 
prepared to adapt law beyond the scope envisioned by state legislatures 
to facilitate a conviction and subsequent punishment. As the Court of 
Appeals argued in Patel’s case, if the legislature wished to consider 
women who end their own pregnancies as performing an act of feticide, 
then they would have made this evident in the statute.222 However, as 
other cases explored in this Article will demonstrate, judicial interpreta-
tion can also work to uphold prosecutors’ stretching of offenses, driven 
by a fetus-first mentality. As outlined in Part IV of this Article, these ju-
dicial efforts have significant implications for fetuses and women.
Hayley and Patel’s cases illustrate the function of the fetus-first 
mentality in both the UK and the US. In both cases attempts were 
made to use existing legislation to punish the women for their actions of 
causing the death of their fetus. In Indiana, the attempt to use the feti-
cide offense ultimately failed following the Court of Appeals’ ruling in 
Patel’s favor and overturning her conviction for this offense.223 In Eng-
land prosecutors were successful, as Hayley was convicted of the offense 
of procuring a miscarriage, even though, as I have argued above, Hay-
ley’s actions should be seen as the killing of a fetus rather than procuring 
a miscarriage. While different legal means were used and different out-
comes achieved, the message is clear: women are expected to adhere to 
the fetus-first mentality, to put the needs and well-being of their fetuses 
before themselves, even if they do not want the child. Neither Hayley 
nor Patel did this, and so their actions were deemed to be those of the 
“bad” mother and to require punishment, regardless of whether or not 
the law can or should be applied in response to such behavior.
B. Consuming Controlled Substances
As argued above, the fetus-first mentality permeates the advice giv-
en to pregnant women, as medical and public health officials regularly 
provide guidance as to what substances they should consume, reduce, or 
avoid. The impact of women’s consumption of substances on the health 
221. See supra text accompanying notes 18–24.
222. Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d. 1041, 1061–62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 202–11.
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of the fetus continues to be a core feature of advice, ranging from what 
not to eat, to how food should be cooked, to which vitamins and min-
erals women should be adding to their diets. It should be noted, howev-
er, that medical consensus about the appropriate advice to give pregnant 
women changes over time.224
One area of fierce controversy relates to women’s consumption of 
controlled substances such as cigarettes, drugs, and alcohol during preg-
nancy. The advice given to women about the consumption of controlled 
substances and the reports of the impact of such substances on fetal 
health demonstrates the focus of medical and public health profession-
als, the general public, and the law on the fetus-first mentality.225 Media
storms about so-called “crack babies” and the panic over the impact and 
consequences of women’s use of certain substances have resulted in gen-
eral adoption of the principle that cigarette, drug, and alcohol use is bad 
for fetuses.226 Thus, there is general public, medical, and political con-
sensus that women must avoid these substances while they are pregnant 
and arguably during the pre-pregnancy period as well.227 Perhaps unsur-
224. For example, in England, the public health message relating to the consumption of 
runny or raw eggs was revised in 2016. Runny or raw eggs are now deemed safe for 
pregnant women to eat. Raw Eggs Safe for Pregnant Women in UK, Say Food Safety 
Experts, THE GUARDIAN (July 26, 2016, 2:39 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2016/jul/26/raw-eggs-safe-for-pregnant-women-in-uk-say-food-safety-experts.
225. See Cecilia Benoit et al., Providers’ Constructions of Pregnant and Early Parenting 
Women Who Use Substances, 36 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 252 (2014); Alexana Gas-
pari, Note, Inheriting Your Mother’s Eyes, Hair, and Drug Addiction: Protecting The 
Drug-Exposed Newborn By Criminalizing Pregnant Drug Use, 54 FAM. CT. REV. 96 
(2016); Raphaël Hammer & Sophie Inglin, ‘I Don’t Think It’s Risky, But. . .’: Preg-
nant Women’s Risk Perceptions of Maternal Drinking and Smoking, 16 HEALTH RISK &
SOC’Y 22 (2014); Nicholas Hookway et al., Risk, Morality and Emotion: Social Media 
Responses to Pregnant Women Who Smoke, 19 HEALTH RISK & SOC’Y 246 (2017); 
Ann Oakley, Smoking in Pregnancy: Smokescreen or Risk Factor? Towards a Materialist 
Analysis, 11 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 311 (1989); Lupton, supra note 57; Thom et 
al., supra note 4.
226. Crack Babies: Twenty Years Later, NPR (May 3, 2010), https://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=126478643&t=1583491940859. See generally, Li-
sa Maher, Criminalizing Pregnancy - The Downside of a Kinder, Gentler Nation?, 17 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 111 (1990) (arguing that the emergence of “crack pregnancies” as a 
public problem needs to be understood in the context of a conservative political 
agenda that is concerned with the promotion of “traditional family values” that em-
bodied the principle of “say no” to particular forms of sexual activity and types of 
drugs).
227. As noted above, pre-pregnancy health is now a prominent feature of public health 
campaigns. See supra notes 57–58; see also Sevilay Temel et al., Evidence-Based Precon-
ceptional Lifestyle Interventions, 36 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REV. 19 (2013); M. Whitworth 
& T. Dowswell, Routine Pre-Pregnancy Health Promotion for Improving Pregnancy 
Outcomes, COCHRANE DATABASE SYS. REV., Oct. 7, 2009; Thom et al., supra note 4.
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prisingly, such messages have impacted the development and application 
of criminal law when pregnant women consume controlled substances. 
This section explores cases where women’s consumption of substances 
perceived to be harmful has come under legal scrutiny. As illustrated in 
the cases below, perceptions that women should not take such drugs are 
entwined with the idea of the fetus-first mentality.
1. Amanda Kimbrough—Alabama, US
As outlined above, in a number of states in the US, fetuses are sub-
ject to legal protection beyond unlawful killing. One example of such 
protection is Alabama’s chemical endangerment offense, which crimi-
nalizes a person responsible for a child if they “knowingly, recklessly, or 
intentionally [cause] or [permit] a child to be exposed to, to ingest or 
inhale or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical sub-
stance, or drug paraphernalia.”228 The focus of the law, when introduced 
in 2006, was to address the concern that children were being exposed to 
dangerous chemicals used in the production of drugs such as metham-
phetamines in so-called “meth labs.”229 However, the rise in the number 
of babies testing positive for drugs at birth has led prosecutors to “[take] 
it upon themselves to begin applying the chemical endangerment law in 
a new manner.”230
In 2008, Amanda Kimbrough’s son was born after an emergency 
Caesarean section; she was 25 weeks and five days pregnant at the 
time.231 Kimbrough’s obstetrician diagnosed her with preterm labor and 
occult cord prolapse, which occurs when the umbilical cord descends 
through the birth canal before the fetus.232 This condition restricts blood 
flow through the umbilical cord. The child, Timmy, was born not 
breathing and with a low heart rate. He died 19 minutes after birth.233
Kimbrough’s urine was screened for drugs and tested positive for meth-
amphetamine, as did Timmy’s blood and a sample of his liver tissue.234
The pediatrician who treated Timmy determined that he had died from 
228. ALA. CODE § 26–15–3(a)(1) (2019).
229. Rachel Suppé, Note, Pregnancy on Trial: The Alabama Supreme Court’s Erroneous 
Application of Alabama’s Chemical Endangerment Law in Ex Parte Ankrom, 7 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y BRIEF 49, 51 (2013).
230. Id. at 55.
231. Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397, 403 (Ala. 2013).
232. Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d at 403.
233. Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d at 403.
234. Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d at 403.
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“respiratory arrest secondary to prematurity.”235 However, a medical ex-
aminer with the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences who per-
formed an autopsy on Timmy concluded that he died from “acute 
methamphetamine intoxication.”236 Kimbrough later stated that she had 
smoked methamphetamine with a friend three days before she had expe-
rienced labor pains.237 Kimbrough pleaded guilty to chemical endan-
germent of a child, reserving the right to appeal.238 The trial court sen-
tenced her to ten years’ imprisonment, the mandatory minimum 
sentence due to the death of the child.239
Prosecutors argued that “child” in the penal code included fetuses 
as well as born children, which allowed them to apply the chemical en-
dangerment law to fetuses and bring the charges against Kimbrough. 
Kimbrough and Hope Ankrom, a woman convicted of the same offense, 
both appealed to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. Ankrom ar-
gued that “[t]he plain language of § 26-15-3.2, Ala.Code 1975, shows 
that the legislature intended for the statute to apply only to a child, not 
a fetus,” and that courts in other states with similar legislation have 
ruled that statutes do not apply to prenatal conduct that allegedly harms 
a fetus.240 The Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed, arguing that the 
plain meaning of the term “child,” as used in the statute, includes an 
unborn child.241 Ankrom and Kimbrough appealed to the Alabama Su-
preme Court, who upheld the ruling that the term ‘child’ was “unam-
biguous” in its inclusion of a fetus.242 The court went further, ruling 
that “adoption of the viability distinction to be inconsistent with the 
plain meaning of the word “child” and with the laws of this State.”243
Consequently, the Alabama Supreme Court rejected the Court of Crim-
inal Appeals’ limited application of the chemical endangerment offense 
to a viable fetus in Ankrom,244 and ruled that the statute applied to all 
fetuses, regardless of viability, meaning that from the point of concep-
tion a fetus is protected as a “child” under state law.245
235. Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d at 403.
236. Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d at 403.
237. Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397, 404 (Ala. 2013).
238. Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d at 402.
239. Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d at 403.
240. Ankrom v. State, 152 So. 3d. 373, 376 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
241. Ankrom v. State, 152 So. 3d 373, 376 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
242. Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d at 409.
243. Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397, 419 (Ala. 2013).
244. Ankrom v. State, 152 So. 3d. 373, 376 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
245. Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d at 419. The judgement was confirmed in Hicks v. 
State, 115 So. 3d 53 (Ala. 2014).
2020] P U T T I N G  T H E  F E T U S  F IR S T 191
The convictions of Kimbrough and Ankrom, and the criminaliza-
tion and punishment of numerous other women prosecuted under the 
offense of chemical endangerment (approximately 60 women total be-
tween 2006 and 2012),246 could be interpreted as justifiable on the basis 
that the women have put the welfare of future children at risk. Howev-
er, such an interpretation fails to consider the practical and legal details 
of these cases, all of which point towards prosecutors and the courts be-
ing influenced by the fetus-first mentality.
In terms of legal considerations, Rachel Suppé has produced one of 
the most coherent analyses of the chemical endangerment offense and 
the development of Alabama state law in relation to fetuses. She argues 
that the courts erred in finding the term “child” was unambiguous.247
The Alabama Supreme Court’s decision was based on the reading of two 
dictionaries that included “fetus” in the definition, while ignoring the 
dictionaries that do not.248 Suppé outlines examples where courts have 
discarded the reading of a dictionary due to the conflicting interpreta-
tions between texts,249 yet this was not done in Ex parte Ankrom. Fur-
thermore, Suppé argues the courts should have considered the four pre-
vious attempts made by Alabama’s legislators to amend the chemical 
endangerment statute to clarify that the offense applied to both born 
children as well as fetuses.250 The attempts indicate that the original 
wording in the statute was not definitive and therefore the term child is 
ambiguous, because if the term was unambiguous then legislators would 
not have needed to attempt to clarify it in the legislation.251 Thus, Suppé 
argues, there is an argument that the court’s legal basis is flawed and 
that Kimbrough had in fact not committed the offense of chemical en-
dangerment.252
On a practical level, use of the law in cases involving fetuses has 
been criticized due to the lack of conclusive medical evidence that drug 
use during pregnancy causes harm to the fetus.253 In instances where the 
246. Ada Calhoun, The Criminalization of Bad Mothers, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 25, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/magazine/the-criminalization-of-bad-
mothers.html.
247. Suppé, supra note 229, at 58.
248. Id. at 59.
249. Id. at 59–60.
250. Id. at 60.
251. Id.
252. See id.
253. See generally DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE,
REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 156–159 (1997); Kylee Sunderlin 
& Laura Huss, The Mythology of “Addicted Babies”: Challenging Media Distortions, 
Laws, and Policies that Fracture Communities, DIFFERENTAKES, Fall 2014, at 1, 3
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pregnancy ends in a miscarriage or stillbirth, frequently the cause of fetal 
death is unknown; drug use cannot be definitively determined as the 
cause of the death of the fetus.254 It is generally not possible to deter-
mine what impact, if any, substance use had on the well-being of the fe-
tus. With this in mind, the conclusions of prosecutors that a woman 
who takes drugs while pregnant is endangering her unborn child be-
comes unfounded in fact.
There is even more doubt about the soundness of applying the 
chemical endangerment offense to pregnant women when considering 
the implication of the law on all women of reproductive age. Suppé ar-
gues the ruling in Ex parte Ankrom has made it a felony for pregnant 
women to take numerous prescription drugs which are legally prescribed 
to them, regardless of whether the prescription is harmful to the fetus.255
The ban would include methadone, the drug often used in the care of 
opioid-dependent pregnant women.256 Following the ruling of the Ala-
bama Supreme Court, a woman in the very early stages of pregnancy 
who is unaware that she is pregnant could potentially still be commit-
ting this offense by consuming the legally prescribed medications be-
cause the law also applies to non-viable pregnancies.257 While possession 
or sale of illegal narcotics is a crime in Alabama, use of those same nar-
cotics is not.258 Thus, the ruling by the Alabama Supreme Court has 
widened the law to capture behavior that is otherwise legal to non-
pregnant people. Such an outcome of criminal law illustrates the epito-
me of gender discrimination, as—generally speaking—only women can 
(challenging the crack baby myth and program to sterilize women who use crack co-
caine); Marsha Rosenbaum & Sheigla Murphy, Women’s Research and Policy Issues, in 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK 1075–92 (Joyce H. Lowinson et 
al. eds., 2005) (arguing that women who use crack cocaine have been scapegoated 
through fetal protection laws related to drug-use to provide political cover for the 
larger social issues, such as the failed “post-Reagan social experiment” which cut so-
cial welfare programs, and complex social conditions that would require major politi-
cal change).
254. See Murphy, supra note 36, at 872. See generally Deborah A. Frank et al., Growth, 
Development and Behavior in Early Childhood Following Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: A 
Systemic Review, 285 JAMA 1613, 1619 (2001); Kathryn A. Kellett, Miscarriage of 
Justice: Prenatal Substance Abusers Need Treatment, Not Confinement Under Chemical 
Endangerment Laws, 40 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 455, 458 
(2014).
255. Suppé, supra note 229, at 65.
256. Id.
257. It is not clear at what stage of gestation the law would begin to apply—whether from 
the moment of fertilization, or upon implantation of the embryo. See supra note 1.
258. Suppé, supra note 229, at 68.
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become pregnant.259 Thus, the statute punishes women, but not men, 
who use either illegal narcotics or lawful medication such as prescription 
drugs. As Suppé argues, since the punishment can result in sentences up 
to life imprisonment, the gender disparity of the statute is of grave sever-
ity.260
Further concern has been raised about the potential for convictions 
of pregnant women for chemical endangerment to be the start of further 
criminal regulation of behavior, resulting in a slippery slope of criminal-
ization. There is the possibility that it will result in control and regula-
tion of all women of reproductive age, just in case she is pregnant and 
just in case her activity is harmful to a fetus.261 Commentators have ar-
gued that punishment of one type of “deviant” behavior during preg-
nancy under the veil of fetal protection makes it possible for the state to 
progress to punishing women for other acts during pregnancy.262 For ex-
ample, it may allow for the State to prosecute women who drink alco-
hol, smoke cigarettes, eat unhealthily, do not seek prenatal care, drive 
recklessly, work at locations that expose them to toxic fumes, or remain 
in violent and physically abusive relationships.263
Further concerns about the criminalization of women who test pos-
itive for controlled substances become evident when examining the 
trends of the personal characteristics of women who are generally prose-
cuted for these types of offenses.264 Pregnant women of color, especially 
black women,265 and women of low income are overrepresented among 
those who have been arrested or subjected to equivalent deprivations of 
259. This point is made with full awareness that gender is performative, and that people 
who identify as men or do not prescribe to the gender binary can and do become 
pregnant. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE xv-xvi (1999); Judith Halberstam, 
The Pregnant Man, 65 THE VELVET LIGHT TRAP 77, 77 (2010).
260. Suppé, supra note 229, at 69.
261. Id.
262. Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, and the Threat to Roe v. Wade,
62 ALB. L. REV. 999, 1003 (1999); Johnsen, supra note 32, at 605-07; Kellett, supra
note 254, at 455; Kathleen Adams, Chemical Endangerment of a Fetus: Societal Protec-
tion of the Defenseless or Unconstitutional Invasion of Women’s Rights, 65 ALA. L. REV.
1353, 1366 (2014).
263. Suppé, supra note 229, at 69.
264. Fineman, supra note 111.
265. E.g. Ira J. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Preg-
nancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEW 
ENG. J. OF MED. 1202, 1202 (1990) (finding that black women in Pinellas County, 
Florida are reported at a rate ten times higher than white women despite the frequen-
cy of a positive result being similar).
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liberty.266 Pregnant women who are deemed to fit the stereotype of 
“white trash” are also criminalized at a higher rate than wealthier white 
women.267 Convictions are more likely among this demographic for two 
reasons. Firstly, public clinics and hospitals that serve low-income wom-
en, who are also often from ethnic minority backgrounds, are more like-
ly to comply with drug reporting regulations than private hospitals.268
Secondly, doctors are influenced, either consciously or unconsciously, 
by drug-user profiles, which are based on racial stereotypes.269 As such, 
black women are much more likely to be reported to the police than 
white women, despite comparable patterns of drug-use.270 The disparity 
of prosecutions and convictions between black and white women and 
poor and rich women is significant and has rightly been the focus of 
criticism as the application of laws and policies of criminalization reflect 
discrimination based on race, ethnicity, and class.271 As Dorothy E. 
Roberts, an eminent American scholar of race, gender, and the law, ar-
gues, society is much more willing to condone the criminalization of 
poor, black women who fail to meet the middle-class ideals of mother-
hood and thus this demographic of drug-users is more likely to face ar-
rest and prosecution.272 Consequently, Roberts argues, the criminal jus-
266. Paltrow & Flavin, Forced Interventions, supra note 49, at 311; Paltrow, supra note 
262, at 1002; ROBERTS, supra note 253, at 152; Seema Mohapatra, Unshackling Ad-
diction: A Public Health Approach to Drug Use During Pregnancy, 18 WIS. J.L.
GENDER & SOC. 241, 257–58 (2011); Linda C. Fentiman, The New Fetal Protection: 
The Wrong Answer to the Crisis of Inadequate Health Care for Women and Children, 84 
DENV. L. REV. 537, 551 (2006).
267. Grace Howard, The Limits of Pure White: Raced Reproduction in the 
Methamphetamine Crisis, 35 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 373, 394 (2014).
268. Loren Siegel, The Criminalization of Pregnant and Child-Rearing Drug Users, in THE 
REDUCTION OF DRUG-RELATED HARM 95, 97–98 (P. A. O’Hare et al. eds. 1992).
269. Id. at 98.
270. Id. at 97.
271. See generally ROBERTS, supra note 253 (arguing that convictions of pregnant women 
are based upon the principle of legitimizing fetal rights and that black women are eas-
ier targets for criminal justice as their arrests are more palpable for the general public 
than the arrest of white women); SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR 
AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN (1991) (discussing that mothers from low-income 
households and who are living in poverty are criminalized for behavior deemed to 
harm fetuses with the justification that the state wants to protect children. However, 
at the same time, services that would improve the health and well-being of pregnant 
women and their children are being cut); Chasnoff et al., supra note 265 (finding that 
despite similar rates of drug use between black and white women during the six 
month study, black women were reported at approximately ten times the rate of 
white women).
272. ROBERTS, supra note 253, at 150–200. As noted above, idealized images of 
motherhood, constructed through the myths of motherhood, are class and race/
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tice system focuses on women whom society deems undeserving of 
motherhood.273
Legal responses to pregnant drug users also reflects US policy relat-
ing to the so-called “war on drugs” and the popular view that drug use is 
a crime, not a medical condition.274 This approach to drug use persists 
despite the World Health Organization and the American Psychiatric 
Association classifying substance abuse as a disease.275 In spite of such 
classifications, the belief that criminalizing pregnant women who use 
controlled substances will act as a deterrent from activity that will harm 
the fetus or encourage women who use drugs to quit prior to pregnancy 
continues to be held. Public perceptions that women who act in a way 
that would hurt a child—whether born or not—deserve to be punished 
and/or that punishment will act as a deterrent for others also plays a role 
in the use of criminal law in these cases.276 Herein lies the connection to 
the fetus-first mentality. The myths of motherhood saturate public per-
ception and encourage the belief that women should put their chil-
dren—including their unborn children—before themselves. These 
myths dictate that the “good” mother would refrain from consuming 
controlled substances to protect her child, regardless of the nature or 
consequence of use. The state and public expect that, when pregnant, a 
woman will manage her fetuses’ risk by following guidance provided by 
the medical community.277 In this instance, that means not consuming 
controlled substances. Paradoxically, while individual risk factors relat-
ing to the behavior and health of the pregnant woman are understood to 
have a consequence on the well-being of the fetus, the impact of social 
and economic factors on the welfare of pregnant women and their fetus-
es are disregarded. This disregard for the impact of social and economic 
factors occurs despite evidence that, as discussed below, these factors 
have as much, if not more, impact on the well-being of the fetus than 
substance use.278
ethnicity biased. Collins, Shifting the Center, supra note 109; COLLINS, BLACK 
FEMINIST THOUGHT, supra note 109.
273. ROBERTS, supra note 253, at 152. See also RICKIE SOLINGER, PREGNANCY AND 
POWER: A SHORT HISTORY OF REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS IN AMERICA (2005).
274. Mohapatra, supra note 266, at 244.
275. Suppé, supra note 229, at 74.
276. Adams, supra note 262; Alisha Marano, Punishing Is Helping: An Analysis of the 
Implications of Ex Parte Ankrom and How the Intervention of the Criminal Justice 
System is a Step in the Right Direction Toward Combating the National Drug Problem 
and Protecting the Child, 35 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 113 (2013).
277. Ruhl, supra note 17, at 103.
278. BORDO, supra note 17, at 83–4; Karen Lane, The Medical Model of the Body as a Site 
of Risk: A Case Study of Childbirth, in SOCIOLOGY OF THE BODY: A READER 157 
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As outlined in Part II, medical conceptualization of the fetus as a 
separate patient has led to the pregnant woman being seen as a potential 
threat to the fetus, and thus the fetus’s security needs to be managed by 
third parties.279 Criminal cases such as Kimbrough and Ankrom’s sug-
gest that when self-management of the fetus’s risk is perceived to not be 
completed by a pregnant woman, some women become subject to insti-
tutions that will manage the risk for them. In Kimbrough and Ankrom’s 
instances, the criminal justice system stepped in to manage the perceived 
risk that they pose as mothers to children due to their drug use. In this 
instance criminal justice acts as a crime control mechanism.280 Through 
identification of behavior considered risky through a criminal convic-
tion, society is able to manage risk that women such as Kimbrough and 
Ankrom may pose to a future fetus. Kimbrough is controlled physically 
through her imprisonment, meaning that it is unlikely that she will be-
come pregnant in the near future. While Ankrom was not imprisoned, 
her conviction means that she is potentially more likely to be monitored 
by child protective services and health professionals if she becomes 
pregnant again, as with other women who are “drug-affected.”281 As 
such, these cases suggest that feminist theorists have correctly identified 
that the fetus is the focus of intervention in pregnancy, rather than the 
general health and well-being of the woman.282
(Jacqueline Low & Claudia Malacrida eds., 2008); Chavkin, supra note 17, at 147; 
Ellen S. Lazarus, What Do Women Want?: Issues of Choice, Control, and Class in Preg-
nancy and Childbirth, 8 MED. ANTHROPOL. Q. 25, 26 (1994); Ruhl, supra note 17, 
at 110–13.
279. HALLIDAY, supra note 78.
280. David Garland argues that from the 1970s onwards in both the UK and US, new 
forms of crime control mechanisms were employed based on the principle of hardline 
policies of deterrence, predicative restraint, and incapacitation. These developments 
occurred simultaneously with the ending of an era dominated by welfare state policies 
and social democratic politics, as well as increased market freedom and the rise of ne-
oliberalism. See generally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND 
SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (Oxford University Press 2001).
281. Jeanne Flavin & Lynn M. Paltrow, Punishing Pregnant Drug-Using Women: Defying 
Law, Medicine, and Common Sense, 29 J. ADDICT. DIS. 231, 240 (2010).
282. See BORDO, supra note 17, at 71–98; MARTIN, supra note 74, at 54–67; ROTH, supra
note 121, at 6; Chavkin, supra note 17, at 194; Phelan, supra note 17, at 481; Ruhl, 
supra note 17, at 107–09.
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2. Sally—England, UK283
Unlike certain state laws in the United States, laws in the United 
Kingdom do not allow criminal convictions for the consumption of 
controlled substances while pregnant.284 The fetus does not have legal 
personality and cannot be the victim of a crime against the person; the 
born-alive rule prevents a woman from being held criminally liable for 
behavior that may cause harm to the fetus.285 Therefore, even if it is 
established that the mother’s use of controlled substances harmed the 
fetus, potentially following the birth of a drug-dependent baby, she has 
not committed a criminal offense in relation to the consumption of the 
substance, or harm that may have been caused to the fetus due to the 
consumption of a substance.286 This principle was recently upheld in 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority v. First-tier Tribunal.287 The 
Court of Appeals’ ruling related to harm done to a child who was born 
alive but with a long-term disability due to the alcohol consumption by 
her birth mother during pregnancy. The child (CP) instituted a civil 
case to claim compensation from the Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Authority on the grounds that the disability she faces is due to an injury 
sustained directly due to a crime of violence—her birth mother’s 
283. “Sally” is not the defendant’s real name. While the case was heard in open court, 
where her name was published, I have anonymized the case in line with requirements 
imposed by the court to view the case. The anonymization is of the identity of the 
defendant and all other parties involved in the case and includes withholding details 
such as class, exact age, ethnicity, geographical location, and the court in which the 
case was heard. As such no citations to the case are provided in this analysis.
284. It is not illegal to consume drugs in the UK, but criminal charges are attached to the 
possession, sale, and production of certain substances, regardless of pregnancy status, 
as well as allowing premises to be used for the consumption of drugs. See Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1971, c. 38, §§ 4-6, 8-9A (UK); Prosecution Guidance: Drug Offences,
CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/drug-offences
(last updated Mar. 12, 2019).
285. This excludes actions that are done with the intent to end the pregnancy but fall out-
side the Abortion Act 1967, c. 87 (Gr. Brit.). See supra note 135 (explaining the 
Abortion Act exemptions). This also excludes actions that kill a child capable of being 
born alive. In either case, the offenses of procuring a miscarriage and child destruc-
tion (respectively) have been committed. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying 
text (explaining these offenses).
286. Unless it can be demonstrated that that substance was intentionally consumed in or-
der to abort the fetus, or that the substance was consumed to kill a child capable of 
being born alive, in which case, the offenses of procuring a miscarriage and child de-
struction may have been committed. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text 
(explaining these offenses).
287. CP (A Child) v. First-Tier Tribunal (criminal injuries compensation) [214] EWCA 
Civ. 1554 [2015] QB 459, 479.
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malicious administering of poison so as to endanger life or inflict 
grievous bodily harm.288 Although this was a civil case, if ruling in favor 
of CP the Court of Appeal would have been required to rule that CP’s 
birth mother had committed a criminal offense in consuming alcohol 
while pregnant in order for CP to recover compensation.289 However, 
the court ruled against CP because at the time the alcohol was ingested, 
CP was not “any other person,” as humans in utero do not have legal
personality.290 Upon being born alive, and thus becoming “any other 
person” and so capable of being a victim of a crime of violence, the 
administration of alcohol—the poison—had stopped. Therefore, the 
crime was never committed against the baby when it had legal 
personality and so the birth mother was not liable.291
Based on the letter of the law, it is not possible for a woman to be 
convicted of an offense due to her consumption of substances, illegal or 
not, while pregnant, so long as the substance is not consumed with in-
tent to end the pregnancy or kill the child capable of being born alive.292
However, as with Hayley’s case, recent prosecutions and convictions of 
women who have been pregnant would suggest that criminal offenses 
are being used to punish behavior women exhibit while pregnant. One 
such example can be seen in the case of Sally, who was convicted on four 
counts of concealment of birth (hereafter “concealment”). While in her 
30s, Sally gave birth to four children after receiving no medical care at 
any stage during her pregnancies. She claimed that all four were still-
born. The bodies were concealed in Sally’s bedroom for over ten years. 
During the period of her pregnancies, Sally reportedly abused alcohol 
and marijuana. She was described as having neglected her living chil-
dren. After the bodies were discovered, Sally was prosecuted for and 
pleaded guilty to four counts of concealment. For each count, Sally was 
sentenced to a community order for two years and subject to supervi-
sion for the whole period.
Due to the decomposed state of the babies’ bodies, it was not pos-
sible to determine if the babies had been born alive or stillborn. Unlike 
in Hayley’s case, there was no evidence to suggest that Sally had acted to 
end her pregnancies. Therefore, the prosecution had little option but to 
accept Sally’s account that she had experienced a spontaneous labor for 
each child, who were all stillborn. In spite of the fact that Sally was not 
288. Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority at 463.
289. Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority at 463.
290. Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority at 474.
291. Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority at 474.
292. If either intent can be proven then the offenses of procuring a miscarriage or child 
destruction may have been committed. See supra notes 22–23.
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convicted of any offense related to harming or killing the fetuses,293 the 
judge specifically criticized Sally’s conduct during her pregnancy and 
suggested that Sally was responsible for the poor outcomes of her preg-
nancies, “Whilst the circumstances and reasons for the stillborn births 
will never fully be able to be established, your chaotic lifestyle choices, 
including alcohol abuse and promiscuity at the time of your pregnancies 
was such as to put the good health of any unborn child at risk.”
While evidence used in a sentencing hearing only impacts sentence 
length and not culpability, the judge’s remarks express a belief that 
Sally’s failure to maintain good health during her pregnancy may well 
have caused the death of the infants. The suggestion that Sally is being 
held culpable for the death of the children due to, among other 
behaviors, her consumption of harmful substances, is strengthened
when considering the elements of the offense of concealment. The 
offense of concealment is concerned only with the secret disposal of a 
body to hide a child’s existence, and not with how or when the child 
died. Therefore, there is arguably no requirement to comment on how 
Sally behaved when she was pregnant because how or when the child 
died has nothing to do with her conviction. The judge’s suggestion that 
Sally’s lifestyle choices while pregnant potentially contributed to or 
caused the stillbirths of her children indicates that the offense of 
concealment is being used to punish Sally for her perceived harmful 
behavior toward her unborn children, in addition to, or potentially 
instead of, punishing the acts of concealing the bodies. Concealment 
was used to punish her for her failing as a mother.294 While Sally was not 
officially convicted of an offense due to her consumption of substances 
while pregnant, the implication that such behavior is harmful and may 
have caused the deaths of the fetuses suggests that the courts see such 
behaviors by pregnant women as worthy of involvement of criminal 
justice. Further evidence of this suggestion is apparent in the judge’s
remarks during sentencing that a mitigating factor in the case is that 
Sally can no longer have children due to her age. If Sally can no longer 
become pregnant, then she will no longer pose a risk to future unborn 
children and therefore her risk does not need to be managed by criminal 
justice.295 Unofficial involvement of criminal justice in cases of drug use 
293. Without intent to end the pregnancy or kill the fetus, behavior that may be harmful 
or cause death to the fetus is not illegal in England. See generally supra notes 19, 23–
24.
294. For further analysis of how concealment has been used to punish women for deviant 
behavior that is beyond the scope of the offense, see Milne, Concealment of Birth,
supra note 27.
295. See generally supra notes 277–78.
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in pregnancy such as Sally’s demonstrate the extent to which the fetus-
first mentality has permeated the criminal justice system and is now an 
acceptable feature of the application of criminal law, even where case law 
exists to preclude such uses of law.296
Such a reaction to a woman for failing to be a “good” enough 
mother, to not put the fetus’s well-being before her own by abstaining 
from drug use, reflects the fetus-first mentality. Perceptions and moth-
erhood ideologies have limited room, if any, for drug users within their 
narrative and construction of the “good” mother. Examples of the in-
compatibility between motherhood ideology and perception of drug us-
ers can be seen in a movement by campaigners to use financial rewards 
to promote and encourage women who use drugs to be sterilized or take 
long acting reversible contraception (LARC).297 Furthermore, there are 
examples of cases from across states in the US where pregnant women 
have been imprisoned or forced to undergo drug rehabilitation treat-
ment due to their use of controlled substances or suspicion that they 
may have used substances prior to becoming pregnant or will use them 
in the future.298 Such reactions to substance users are troubling not only 
because of the implications on the rights of pregnant women, but also 
because of the negative impact of prison on pregnant women and their 
fetuses.299 Instead of voluntary, supportive, free, and accessible treatment 
296. Notably, the born-alive rule. See supra notes 18–21, 280–281.
297. While such campaigns have remained unofficial, promoted and funded by private 
groups, they have continued to operate in the US and have seen support in the UK. 
Paul Bois, This Woman Pays Drug Addicts to Get Sterilized, THE DAILY WIRE
(Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.dailywire.com/news/25334/woman-pays-drug-addicts-
get-sterilized-paul-bois; Charity Offers UK Drug Addicts £200 to Be Sterilised, BBC
NEWS (Oct. 17, 2010), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-11545519.
298. For example, the Wisconsin “Unborn Child Protection” Law, which was deemed 
unconstitutional in May 2017. Federal Court Declares Wisconsin “Unborn Child Pro-
tection” Law Unconstitutional, NATIONAL ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN (May 
1, 2017 12:33 PM),  http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/blog/2017/05/
federal_court_declares_wiscons.php; JEANNE FLAVIN, OUR BODIES, OUR CRIMES:
THE POLICING OF WOMEN’S REPRODUCTION IN AMERICA 112–16 (2009); Flavin & 
Paltrow, Punishing Pregnant Drug-Using Women, supra note 281, at 233; David C.
Brody & Heidee McMillin, Combating Fetal Substance Abuse and Governmental Fool-
hardiness Through Collaborative Linkages, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Common 
Sense: Helping Women Help Themselves, 12 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. J. 243, 247–56
(2001); Myrisha S.  Lewis, Criminalizing Substance Abuse and Undermining Roe v. 
Wade: The Tension Between Abortion Doctrine and the Criminalization of Prenatal 
Substance Abuse, 23 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN AND THE L. 185, 189–98 (2017). 
See also, Paltrow & Flavin, Forced Interventions, supra note 49.
299. See, e.g., Catherine Ingram Fogel, Pregnant Inmates Risk Factors and Pregnancy 
Outcomes, 22 J. OBSTETRIC, GYNECOLOGIC, & NEONATAL NURSING 33, 33–34
(1993); E. Bard et al., Perinatal Health Care Services for Imprisoned Pregnant Women 
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for pregnant drug users, there is limited support for women who use 
controlled substances during their pregnancies, and instead a promotion 
of methods that either prevent drug users from becoming pregnant or 
forcibly prevent women from using drugs while pregnant (imprison-
ment or court-ordered rehabilitation).300
Such response to drug users who are or may become pregnant, in-
cluding criminal justice responses, provide further evidence for the fe-
tus-first mentality. If the aim was to improve the health of pregnant 
women who use drugs while pregnant and so support the health of the 
fetus, then pregnancy and drug-use support would be advocated over 
punishment.301 The message being conveyed is that the “good” mother 
will not consume controlled substances: If you consume controlled sub-
stances then we will either prevent you from being a mother or punish 
you for being the “bad” mother who takes drugs. Within this context, 
the cases of Kimbrough and Sally can be seen as outcomes of wider poli-
cy and perceptions towards women who use controlled substances, as 
well as towards women who are deemed to fall outside the ideology of 
the “good” mother. These cases, among others, indicate a perceived need 
to control and ultimately punish women for behavior deemed deviant 
for mothers.
VI. Implications of the Fetus-first Mentality
Two types of cases have been presented to illustrate the influence of 
the fetus-first mentality on legal interpretations of women’s behavior 
while they are pregnant. In each case, prosecutors and judges have in-
terpreted or attempted to interpret the law to hold women criminally 
liable in instances where harm to the fetus has occurred or it is perceived 
that it could have occurred as a result of the pregnant woman’s behav-
ior. It is not the intention of this Article to argue that the criminal jus-
tice systems were wrong to prosecute, convict, and punish these women. 
Instead, my aim is to outline how the fetus-first mentality is reflected in 
and Associated Outcomes: A Systematic Review, 16 BMC PREGNANCY AND 
CHILDBIRTH 285, 286 (2016); Caitlin McMillen Dowell et al., Determinants of 
Infant Mortality for Children of Women Prisoners: A Longitudinal Linked Data Study,
18 BMC PREGNANCY AND CHILDBIRTH 202, 214–17 (2018); G. G. Ferszt & J. G. 
Clarke, Health Care of Pregnant Women in U.S. State Prisons, 23 J. HEALTH CARE 
POOR UNDERSERVED 557, 557–59 (2012).
300. See Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, supra note 262, at 1007–09; Flavin & Paltrow 
Punishing Pregnant Drug-Using Women, supra note 281, at 232–34; FLAVIN, supra
note 298, at 111–12.
301. See SOLINGER, PREGNANCY AND POWER, supra note 273, at 234–35.
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these cases. In so doing, it is important to consider the potential conse-
quences these cases have beyond the impact on the women involved. 
This Part of the Article outlines the potential ramifications of protecting 
fetuses through criminal law by considering the results of criminalizing 
pregnant women on the well-being of fetuses, the impact on women’s 
rights and freedoms, and on perceptions of motherhood.302
One justification for laws regulating women’s behavior while preg-
nant is that they result in greater protection for fetuses and therefore 
improved fetal health outcomes.303 This is often cited as the intended 
outcome of law by policy makers and criminal justice professionals.304 If 
the laws actually improved fetal outcomes, perhaps there would be a jus-
tification for regulating women’s behavior, as in the cases outlined 
above.305 However, one of the critiques of criminalizing the conduct of 
women while pregnant is that this use of law has failed to protect fetuses 
from harm or death, as argued below.
One of the challenges of demonstrating the positive impact of fetal 
protection laws is that it is very difficult to determine whether the ac-
tions of pregnant women directly lead to harm to or death of the fetus. 
For example, in instances where illegal substances have been consumed 
and the pregnancy ends in a miscarriage or stillbirth, frequently the 
cause of fetal death is unknown.306 Advocates argue that the socioeco-
nomic background of the pregnant woman has a greater impact on ma-
ternal and fetal health than maternal behavior. Deprivation has a dra-
matic impact upon women’s decisions about their health and life during
pregnancy, such as whether they can afford to access healthcare.307
Within the US context, access to available healthcare and affordability 
of health insurance have been noted to be a significant problem for poor 
302. The analysis in this section will focus on the US, as a greater level of critique of using 
criminal law to regulate and sanction pregnant women has been developed due to the 
development of fetal protection laws in these jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the argu-
ments apply to England and Wales due to the way legislation has been interpreted 
and used in cases, as outlined in this Article.
303. See generally, Thom et al., supra note 4.
304. Carolyn B. Ramsey, Restructuring the Debate Over Fetal Homicide Laws, 67 OHIO ST.
L. J. 721, 734–35 (2006).
305. Such a statement needs to be considered in line with the arguments made below 
about the impact on the rights of women, as argued in Part VI of this Article.
306. Kellett, supra note 254; Mohapatra, supra note 266, at 249–50; Frank et al., supra
note 254.
307. See Erin D. Kampschmidt, Prosecuting Women for Drug Use During Pregnancy: The 
Criminal Justice System Should Step Out and the Affordable Care Act Should Step Up,
25 HEALTH MATRIX: J. L.-MED. 487, 506–09 (2015); Steven J. Ondersma et al., 
Prenatal Drug Exposure and Social Policy: The Search for an Appropriate Response, 5 
CHILD MALTREATMENT 93, 105 (2000); See generally Frank et al., supra note 254.
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pregnant women; there are also racial and ethnic disparities in insurance 
status.308 Lack of access to healthcare may be linked to women’s behav-
ior during pregnancy—for example they may not seek advice regarding 
substance use. However, the connection is indirect and a result of pov-
erty and deprivation, rather than intent to harm the fetus.
Even when there is clear evidence that maternal behavior caused 
harm to the fetus, such as with fetal alcohol syndrome,309 it is still not 
necessarily the case that legal sanctions against women will improve the 
well-being of the fetus. In fact, legal sanctions can lead to worse fetal 
outcomes. Many pregnant women who have been subject to criminal 
justice involvement in their pregnancies have been reported to the police 
by hospital staff.310 The initiation of criminal justice involvement by 
medical professionals has led to fears that this may damage the doctor-
patient relationships and lead women who may be at risk of being crim-
inalized to avoid prenatal care altogether.311 Such concerns have been 
mirrored by medical associations and groups, such as The American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,312 and groups primarily 
concerned with the health and rights of children, such as the American 
Academy of Pediatrics and the Center for the Future of Children.313 As 
with poverty, lack of prenatal care is a leading factor in poor pregnancy 
outcomes.314 Criminal sanctions, rather than improving fetal outcomes, 
can lead to women foregoing prenatal care or deciding to terminate a 
308. Fentiman, supra note 266, at 587–92.
309. See generally Alcohol and Pregnancy: Preventing and Managing Fetal Alcohol Spectrum 
Disorders, BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (June 2007), https://www.bma.org.uk/
collective-voice/policy-and-research/public-and-population-health/alcohol/alcohol-
and-pregnancy (last updated Feb. 2016).
310. Paltrow & Flavin, Forced Interventions, supra note 49; this was the case with Hayley 
and Patel, as outlined above.
311. Jessica M. Boudreaux & John W. Thompson, Maternal-Fetal Rights and Substance 
Abuse: Gestation Without Representation, 43 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 137, 140 
(2015).
312. Comm. On Health Care for Underserved Women, AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS 
AND GYNECOLOGISTS, Opinion No. 473: Substance Abuse Reporting and 
Pregnancy: The Role of the Obstetrician–Gynecologist (January 2011 [Reaffirmed 
2014]), available at https://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee-Opinions/
Committee-on-Health-Care-for-Underserved-Women/
co473.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20170224T0820264139 (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
313. CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, PUNISHING WOMEN FOR THEIR BEHAVIOR 
DURING PREGNANCY: AN APPROACH THAT UNDERMINES WOMEN’S HEALTH AND 
CHILDREN’S INTEREST 8 (2000), https://www.reproductiverights.org/document/
punishing-women-for-their-behavior-during-pregnancy-an-approach-that-
undermines-womens-heal.
314. See Kampschmidt, supra note 307, at 506–09; Ondersma et al., supra note 307, at 
105; see generally Frank et al., supra note 254.
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pregnancy out of fear of legal ramifications.315 Therefore, one of the in-
direct consequences of the use of criminal law to regulate and sanction 
pregnant women could be harm or death to the fetus due to the preg-
nant woman deciding to not seek medical assistance or to terminate her 
pregnancy.316
Criminal sanctions for substance abuse during pregnancy can also 
lead to worse health outcomes for the pregnant woman. It is widely ar-
gued that medical treatment and support for women with substance 
abuse issues would be far more appropriate, safer, and result in better 
outcomes for both women and their unborn children.317 Treatment of 
pregnant drug users would require financial commitment, as would 
providing adequate reproductive services to women throughout their 
lives, with specific targeted treatment for those who are most vulnerable. 
There is a lack of available treatment programs for pregnant drug users 
across the US due to stigma, lack of financial resources, private health 
insurance companies refusing to cover alcohol and drug treatment, and 
many rehabilitation programs’ inability or unwillingness to provide 
pregnant women with both addiction treatment and prenatal medical 
care.318 As Linda Fentiman, a specialist in health law and criminal law, 
argues, it is far easier and far cheaper to point to a vulnerable woman 
with a positive drug test who has given birth to a stillborn child and an-
nounce that it is she—and she alone—who is to blame for the death of 
her child.319
One of the most-cited negative implications of using criminal law 
to sanction the behavior of women while pregnant is the impact upon 
the rights of all women, whether pregnant or not. One of the key cri-
tiques of fetal protection laws raised by feminists in the US is that the 
laws may threaten women’s ability to access abortion, as the determina-
tion that a fetus is a legal “person” allows for the fetus to be identified as 
315. Murphy, supra note 36, at 873–74.
316. This point is made with recognition of the increasing control and regulation placed 
on abortion in many states across America, resulting in a near ban on abortion in 
some states. See supra note 138.
317. See generally Emma Cave, Drink and Drugs in Pregnancy: Can the Law Prevent Avoid-
able Harm to the Future Child?, 8 MED. L. INT’L 165 (2007); Kenneth A. De Ville & 
Loretta M. Kopelman, Fetal Protection in Wisconsin’s Revised Child Abuse Law: Right 
Goal, Wrong Remedy, 27 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 332 (1999); Maternal Rights and Fetal 
Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of Fetal Abuse, 101 HARV. L. REV. 994 
(1988); Murphy, supra note 36; Adams, supra note 262; Mohapatra, supra note 266;
Fentiman, supra note 266; Brody & McMillin, supra note 298; FLAVIN, supra note 
298; Kampschmidt, supra note 307.
318. See Suppé, supra note 229, at 67–73.
319. Fentiman, supra note 266, at 541.
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an autonomous entity with rights equivalent and in opposition to the 
rights of the pregnant woman.320 Many of the restrictions on abortion in 
the US have been implemented on the basis of states’ rights to protect 
the life of the fetus.321 While it has been argued that providing the fetus 
with legal personality would not be a significant enough legal challenge 
alone,322 concern has been raised that legal protection for the fetus will 
contribute to a pro-life cultural message that portrays abortion as im-
moral within a wider message of the “culture of life.”323
Beyond access to abortion, other implications of fetal protection 
laws have been identified by scholars, notably that the laws are 
discriminatory against women and interfere with women’s rights to 
liberty and privacy.324 By sanctioning the behavior of women while 
pregnant, as in the cases outlined above, the state is depriving women of 
their rights because of their pregnancy status. This is due to the fact that 
320. See generally Anannya Bhattacharjee, Private Fists and Public Force: Race, Gender, And 
Sexuality, in POLICING THE NATIONAL BODY: SEX, RACE, AND CRIMINALIZATION 1–
54 (Jael Miriam Silliman & Anannya Bhattacharjee eds. 2002); Amanda K. Bruchs, 
Clash of Competing Interests: Can the Unborn Victims of Violence Act and Over Thirty 
Years of Settled Abortion Law Co-exist Peacefully?, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 133 (2004); 
Dawn Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs: Governmental Regulation of Pregnant Women’s
Lives after Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 179 (1989); Tara Kole & Laura Kadetsky, 
The Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 215 (2002); Lisa Mclen-
nan Brown, Feminist Theory and the Erosion of Women’s Reproductive Rights: The Im-
plications of Fetal Personhood Laws and in Vitro Fertilization, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER &
SOC. POL’Y & L. 87 (2005); Jean Reith Schroedel et al., Women’s Rights and Fetal Per-
sonhood in Criminal Law, 7 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 89 (2000); Folger, supra
note 33; MacKinnon, supra note 77; Paltrow, supra note 262; De Ville & Kopelman, 
supra note 317.
321. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Service, 492 U.S. 490, 504–07 (1989) (de-
ciding that the Supreme Court did not need to consider the constitutionality of the 
preamble of Missouri’s state laws, which stated that the life of each human being be-
gins at conception, as it is not used to justify any abortion regulation otherwise inva-
lid under Roe v. Wade. As such, the Court held that states have the right to determine 
when life begins as a value judgement.); Clarke D. Forsythe & Keith Arago, Roe v. 
Wade & the Legal Implications of State Constitutional Personhood Amendments, 30
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS PUB. POL’Y 273, 284–95 (2016); Ramsey, supra note 304,
at 726–43.
322. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 923–26 (1973); Michael C. Dorf, How Abortion Politics Impedes Clear Thinking
on Other Issues Involving Fetuses, FINDLAW (May 28, 2003), 
http://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/how-abortion-politics-impedes-clear-
thinking-on-other-issues-involving-fetuses.html.
323. Ramsey, supra note 304; Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the 
Culture of Life, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 753 (2006).
324. Johnsen, supra note 320, at 189; Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: 
What’s Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 9, 31–32 (1987); see also
BORDO, supra note 17; FLAVIN, supra note 298; HALLIDAY, supra note 78.
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the behavior would not be sanctioned if committed while not pregnant. 
Dawn Johnsen, a constitutional law scholar and professor, argues that 
such state prescription of behavior deprives women of the right to 
control their lives during pregnancy—a fundamental right of liberty and 
privacy, as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, and 
specifically the Fourteenth Amendment.325 Women have the right to 
refuse medical intervention and to be free from criminal or civil liability 
for their conduct during pregnancy, based on the common law and 
constitutional rights of privacy, bodily integrity, and personal decision-
making. These rights include the freedom from coercion of medical 
treatment, freedom in choice for a family life, the right to self-
determination, the right to non-subordination, the freedom from bodily 
invasion, and appropriation of the body for the purpose of another (the 
fetus).326 And yet, many US states have demonstrated that they are 
prepared to prioritize the protection of the fetus over the pregnant 
woman’s rights to bodily autonomy and integrity.327
In England and Wales, as outlined above, women have no right to 
abortion, only the right to ask a doctor if they will be granted an 
abortion;328 as such, women are restricted from the fundamental right to 
control their own bodies in relation to deciding to continue a 
pregnancy. It should be noted, however, that while abortion is legally 
restricted, the reality is that the procedure is widely available and free for 
all women who are entitled to free treatment under the National Health 
Service,329 and there currently appears to be little to no appetite to 
reduce women’s access to abortion.330 Nevertheless, as recent legal cases 
325. Johnsen, supra note 320, at 191, 197–201.
326. Gallagher, supra note 324, at 29; see also BORDO, supra note 17; FLAVIN, supra note 
298.
327. HALLIDAY, supra note 78, at 7–39.
328. Sheldon, supra note 162, at 13–14; Sheldon, supra note 23, at 342–46.
329. Jessica Potter, Who Has to Pay for the NHS and When?, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 6, 
2018, 1:00 AM), http://theconversation.com/who-has-to-pay-for-the-nhs-and-when-
91344; PUB. HEALTH ENG., NHS ENTITLEMENTS: MIGRANT HEALTH GUIDE (Dec.
19, 2019), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/nhs-entitlements-migrant-health-
guide#free-for-all. Primary care is free of charge for all registered patients and tempo-
rary patients (defined as a patient who is in the area for more than 24 hours and less 
than three months). Secondary care is free of charge for UK residents and those living 
lawfully in the UK on a properly settled basis for the time being.
330. However, Members of Parliament occasionally raise the prospect of reducing the 
term limit for abortions that are not due to risk of maternal death or fetal abnormali-
ty. Maya Oppenheim, Jeremy Hunt Criticised for Taking ‘Cavalier Approach’ to Wom-
en’s Needs After Abortion Time Limit Comments, THE INDEPENDENT (June 10, 2019, 
3:15 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jeremy-hunt-abortion-
time-limit-tory-leadership-contest-conservative-party-a8952306.html.
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analyzed above indicate, there is a trend towards limiting women’s 
rights while pregnant. Connection is made within these cases as to 
women’s harm to fetuses and rights to abortion, as apparent in 
sentencing remarks made by the Judge in Hayley’s case, “There is no 
mitigation available to you by reference to the Abortion Act, whatever 
view one takes of its provisions, which are wrongly so liberally construed 
in practice as to make abortion available essentially on demand prior to 
24 weeks, subject to medical practitioners’ approval.”
British advocates, such as Emeritus Professor Margaret Brazier, a 
leading scholar of medical law and ethics, have argued that changing the 
law to require pregnant women to act in the best interests of their fetus-
es would remove behavioral choice and prioritize the needs of the fetus 
over the pregnant woman.331 Introducing law to protect the interests of 
the fetus would result in undue restrictions on women’s liberty, auton-
omy, and privacy, as protected under human rights.332 Every choice in a 
pregnant woman’s life would be subject to scrutiny and so she would be 
rendered vulnerable to coercion by others. For example, if a woman is 
advised by her doctor that a medical procedure is required and legal 
sanctions were a potential consequence of a woman deciding to not fol-
low medical advice, then her ability to “choose” to have the procedure is 
removed.333
In presenting a critical assessment of the impact of the fetus-first 
mentality on women’s rights, I am not advocating that women should 
not be prosecuted for any criminal offense committed while pregnant. 
Instead, I am advocating that criminal law should be applied equally to 
all people—it should be applied to people who are pregnant the same as 
it is applied to people who are not pregnant. Therefore, differential ap-
plication of criminal law or sentencing on the basis of a woman being 
pregnant or that she may become pregnant intrudes on fundamental 
rights of privacy and bodily autonomy, protected in the US under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of liberty and in the UK under the 
Human Rights Act.334 Without such protections, women would be 
forced to live in fear of being pregnant, or even being fertile, as the basis 
under which the government may impose extensive burdens on their 
331. Margaret Brazier, Liberty, Responsibility, Maternity, 52 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 359 
(1999).
332. Human Rights Act 1998 c. 42 (Eng.).
333. EMILY JACKSON, REGULATING REPRODUCTION: LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND 
AUTONOMY (2001); Michael Thomson, After re S, 2 MED. L. REV. 127 (1994).
334. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1; Human Rights Act 1998, c.42 (UK); see also Oppen-
heim, supra note 330.
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freedoms.335 Consequently, sanctioning women for conduct while preg-
nant reinforces the traditional sex-based discrimination by disadvantag-
ing women based on their reproductive capacity, in spite of the fact that 
having a child involves a woman taking on an important function neces-
sary for the survival of the human species.336 No other person in any 
other circumstance is expected to put the well-being of someone else be-
fore themselves in the way that pregnant women are increasingly re-
quired to for their fetuses.337 As Howard Minkoff, a leading American 
obstetrician and gynecologist, and Lynn M. Paltrow, Executive Director 
and founder of the National Advocates for Pregnant Women, a non-
profit organization focused on human rights and civil liberties of preg-
nant women, argue, if a child needed a bone marrow transplant to sur-
vive, and the only available donor was the child’s father, it would never 
be considered an acceptable intervention by the state to legally compel 
that man to donate.338 However, when an equivalent situation occurs for 
a woman in relation to her fetus, as with an expectation that she will 
have a caesarean section, or not consume certain substances, repeatedly, 
in different jurisdictions, the state is willing to intervene to force women 
to comply.339 As Minkoff and Paltrow argue, “the State has now en-
dowed the fetus with greater rights than its living siblings and, for that 
matter, any born person of any age.”340
A final concern of the fetus-first mentality in the context of crimi-
nal law is that it represents state-sanctioned motherhood. If the state in-
dicates that it is prepared to curb the behavior of pregnant women 
through threat of imprisonment for the sake of the health of the fetus, 
“a state legitimized form of motherhood” is effectively being imposed 
on all women.341 As outlined in Part II, the myths of motherhood have 
been recognized as operating in social and cultural contexts and having a 
discriminatory impact on women. The operation of such ideology with-
in criminal justice has equally discriminatory implications. Most nota-
bly, who is perceived to be the “good” mother, and, more importantly, 
335. Johnsen, supra note 320, at 201.
336. Johnsen, supra note 32, at 620–25; see also Dawn Johnsen, A New Threat to Pregnant 
Women’s Autonomy, 17 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 33 (1987); Michelle Oberman, The 
Control of Pregnancy and the Criminalization of Femaleness, 7 BERKELEY J. GENDER L.
& JUST. 1, 2 (1992).
337. See Johnsen, A New Threat to Pregnant Women’s Autonomy, supra note 336.
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the “bad” mother who needs to be controlled and regulated through 
criminal law.
Feminists have criticized fetal homicide laws on the basis that when 
implemented, legislatures were less concerned with the welfare of the fe-
tus—evident in the detrimental impacts outlined above—and more 
concerned with the behavior of women and mothers. For example, 
Rickie Solinger, a historian focused on reproductive politics, race, class, 
and motherhood, argues that if the state valued women and children, 
then it would fund necessary medical treatment for pregnant women, 
such as drug rehabilitation, and assist women to achieve good health 
during pregnancy.342 As such, Solinger argues, this state-intervention 
says far more about the “type” of woman that “should” be a mother. 
While Solinger’s critique is focused on the criminalization of pregnant 
drug users, her argument can be applied to other activities and behaviors 
by women while pregnant that may be deemed harmful to the fetus.343
State-sponsored coercion of pregnant women’s behavior “compels wom-
en who desire children to reorganize their lives in accordance with judi-
cially defined norms of behavior.”344 Furthermore, laws designed to pro-
tect fetuses are applied discriminatorily; in the US, women of color and 
poor women are overrepresented among those arrested or subject to 
equivalent deprivations of liberty.345 Such women are furthest away from 
the “ideal” mother represented in the myths of motherhood.
V. Conclusion
The application of the fetus-first mentality within criminal law has 
resulted in dangerous legal developments that challenge women’s rights, 
while, evidently, doing little to protect fetuses. The implications are the 
same whether laws have been specifically enacted to protect fetuses, as in 
the US, or if such legal protection is technically not a feature of the 
342. SOLINGER, supra note 273, at 236.
343. See also FLAVIN, supra note 298; ROBERTS, supra note 253 (noting decisions by some 
courts to require women who take drugs to take long acting reversible contraception 
to prevent pregnancy, which indicates that the concern lies in the woman’s ability to 
get pregnant and her suitability as a mother, rather than the desire to treat her drug 
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treatment for drug-users in general would be the focus of the criminal justice system 
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criminal law, as in England and Wales. Criminalization of women who 
fall short of the ideals of motherhood is the most extreme aspect of the 
governance of pregnancy, outlined in Part II. Self-regulation and mater-
nal sacrifice are defining characteristics of the myths of motherhood and 
are perceived to demonstrate a woman’s “love” and devotion to her fetus 
and future child.346 As illustrated by the CDC’s message about women’s 
consumption of alcohol and NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde’s report on 
preconception health,347 public messages encourage women to self-
regulate for the good of their unborn child, even if not yet conceived 
and if the woman has no plans or desires to conceive. It is clear from the 
content and tone of these public health messages that organizations such 
as the CDC consider it appropriate and acceptable to deliver such mes-
sages to all women of reproductive age; this suggests that there is a gen-
eral acceptance of these messages and the ideologies that lie behind 
them—the principle that women should be prepared to self-regulate 
and deprive themselves of things they desire for the betterment of a fu-
ture child. That is not to say that either the CDC’s or NHS Greater 
Glasgow & Clyde’s messages were accepted without contestation, as a 
number of commenters were highly critical of the press releases,348 and a 
social media storm ensued.349 The CDC later amended the infographic 
while standing by the message.350 Nevertheless, the nature of messages 
such as these points to the wide acceptability of the principle that wom-
en should do what is best for the fetus. The criminalization of numerous 
women in the US and the small number of women in England, such as 
Hayley and Sally, can be seen as extreme examples of a wider social and 
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cultural movement towards state regulation of pregnancy. Thus, using 
criminal law to sanction the behavior of pregnant women should be un-
derstood as being at the extreme end of a spectrum of the regulation of 
women’s behavior through public health messages, medical “advice” and 
intervention, and social and cultural expectations.
Nevertheless, one of the challenges in this area of law is how to bal-
ance the rights of the pregnant woman with the protection of the fetus. 
There is ongoing debate as to whether a fetus has rights and should be 
protected under law.351 Engaging in this philosophical and ethical debate 
is outside of the scope of this Article; however, as analyzed above, it is 
important to note the practical implications of enshrining fetal rights in 
law—notably the negative consequences for women’s rights and the lim-
ited gains in outcomes for fetuses. Supporting women—not just 
through their pregnancies and reproductive choices, but also more wide-
ly—is likely to have a far greater impact on the well-being of fetuses.352
This is particularly true for women living in poverty, who are therefore 
at a greater risk of negative pregnancy outcomes. However, such an ap-
proach would require governments to acknowledge that their attitudes 
and practices towards women’s rights are limited and are causing harm, 
and to be prepared to invest in services to support women. Sadly, label-
ing women as “bad” mothers who belong in prison is the far easier op-
tion.
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